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The idea behind the realization of this thesis has matured in recent years. When I started to 
move my first steps in the university, I did not know what I liked. I used to study passively, 
without passion. Only during my third year of bachelor, I started to notice a sort of “tickle” in 
my brain while facing innovation topics. I decided to indulge that tickle, which eventually led 
me to enroll at Entrepreneurship and Innovation Master, here at Padova, and also led me to 
know better China and its innovation ecosystem, because, to me was and is clear, that China 
will “host” next Silicon Valley so it is impossible to say innovation without saying China. 
So, when I discovered Professor Mauro Giacomazzi’s class I immediately was caught up. The 
class taught me that our “business conception” of China is often a misconception, driven by 
clichés, and that there is a huge underused potential for many western companies there. Italy 
should look at east, aware of the threats and the challenges but also with hope and the 
willingness to do that characterizes our entrepreneurial class.  
 
 
Objective of the thesis. 
I built this thesis to better understand the challenges and opportunities an Italian small-medium 
enterprise (SME) may face during its journey toward Chinese markets. I covered the existing 
literature for what concerns the internationalization process (meant as export and establishment 
of new venture) and the difficulties and advantages may arise from it. Then, I compared the 
literature with data coming from the real scenario of Italian company that want to move or 
export to China.  
Finally, without any presumption of writing an experimental thesis, I decided to interview two 
actors who are involved in relations with China, to listen to their opinions and to assess whether 













1. Definitions and Literature. 
 
1.1. The SME definition. 
 
The concept of small-medium enterprise has not always been the one we know. While there 
was not a unified definition for every European state, each country had its own criteria to mark 
what was to be considered a SME and what not. Italy considered a company to be small-medium 
enterprise when it had fewer than 250 persons as staff, while Germany used to apply the same 
definition for companies with less than 500 persons. With the Commission Recommendation 
2003/361/ EC, as published in the Official Journal of the European Union L 124, p. 36 of 20 
May 2003, the European Union put the foundation for what is to be considered a unified 
definition, that provides: 
 
 Staff headcount lower than 250 
 Annual turnover equal or lower than 50 million of euro 
 Balance sheet total equal or lower than 43 million of euro 
 
While the staff headcount is mandatory to be lower than 250 for the firm to be considered SME, 
the same rule does not apply to the other two points. Indeed, the company may choose to meet 
either the annual turnover or the balance sheet total ceiling, exciding one of them without losing 
the status of small-medium enterprise. 
 
Whenever a company may exceed the threshold for headcount or financial ceiling during a 
financial year, this will not affect its status of SME. This warranty, provided by article 4.2 of 
the Recommendation, has the aim of providing stability and certainty to those firms that are 
close to the limits. However, the status is lost when a company exceeds the limits for two 
financial years. The same rule applies also to larger companies who present a reduction of 










1.2. The internationalization theories. 
 
The economic literature has struggled to find a precise and well-defined theory 
of internationalization. Different scopes and different concepts of broadness may be applied to 
the definition, making internationalization a “smoky” concept. Different “schools of thought” 
have emerged during the years, following the developing and the progress of globalization. 
These streams of studies can be summarized in (Ribau, Moreira, & Raposo, 2015): the Uppsala 
model, the eclectic paradigm, the network internationalization theory and the new ventures born 





The Upsala model is a model that conceives the internationalization as a slow process that takes 
place over time. It has been mainly developed by the Nordic School, with the wok and studies 
of Johanson and Vahlne (1977). The model is based on the presence on some mandatory stages 
the company must face in order to go international. Although is one of the most cited and 
analyzed theories in the modern economics this school received critiques because it could not 
find empirical proofs. In addition, it has been criticized because described as too static, not 
focused on the seeking of international opportunities but rather focused on the steps/activities 
the company goes through. Indeed, with the Upsala Model, the company goes international 
when it receives the first order from abroad. Before this particular condition there are three 
elements that keep the company from internationalizing: 
 Lack of knowledge of foreign market. 
 Risk aversion. 
 High perceived uncertainty. 
Once overcome these three factors and after the first international sale, the company “tastes” 
what is like doing business abroad, hence develops knowledge and can go on with the process. 
The literature has found this model particularly suitable for SMEs, especially after the model 
was revisited basing it on the network model (that I will cover later). 
These are the steps the company faces: 
 
1. No regular export activities 
2. Export via independent representatives 




4. Establishment of foreign production/manufacturing unites  
 
 
The eclectic paradigm. 
The eclectic paradigm, also called OLI (ownership, location and internationalization) is theory 
developed by Dunning in 1977. It is based on macroeconomics and it has as its base the 
transaction cost elements and robust market theories. 
The eclectic paradigm is a simple but deep framework that center the theory on the relationships 
between three variables. The first ones are ownership specific (O). They include tangible and 
intangible assets. The second variable is related to the location of the firm in particular country. 
They matter because allow the firm to exploit barriers, dynamins and political situation to 
develop its business. The last variable that create competitive advantage for the firm is 
internationalization (I). It consists in exploiting the ownership advantages internally rather than 







The eclectic paradigm has found consistent results in different sectors, especially for what 
concerns FDI, but after the years 90s with the increase of level of globalization a new element 
of interconnection between O, L and I was stressed by Dunning. As Cantwell and Narula (2001) 
pointed out, the interconnection between the three elements is manifested through MNEs cross-
border activities. 
From this theory, other interesting theories evolved, like for example the OLMA paradigm 
(ownership, location, entry modes and adjustment) by Guisinger (2001) or like an advanced 
version of the eclectic model by Dunning and Lundand (2008) which includes the institutional 
variable. 
Again, as for the Upsala Model, the OLI model receives critiques for what concerns the 
explanation of why company internationalize, without stressing the differences between 







The network model. 
The network model of internationalization is defined as the establishment, maintenance and 
development of relations with network participants on foreign market (Johanson & Mattsson 
1988; Turnbull & Valla 1986).  According to Johanson and Mattson (1988), the position in the 
network, that could be domestic or foreign, determines the level of relations with 
other participants and hence the degree of internationalization. 
The starting point for internationalization is given by the position occupied by the company 
inside the network. A company may decide on: 
 
 International extension, that is the decision to establish new relationships with 
foreign markets. 
 International penetration, that is the decision to extend and develop the networks in 
country in which it already operates. 
 International integration, that is the decision to coordinate relationships in various 
foreign markets. 
 
Johanson and Mattsson (1988) also provide four possible variants of internationalization, 
keeping in mind that in the network model, it should be considered not only the individual 
company (and its assets) but also the network in which it is collocated (so the market assets).  
 
The scheme is the following: 
 
 
 Degree of market (network) internationalization 
low high 
Degree of company 
internationalization 
low Early starter Late starter 
high Lonely international International among others 










The first quadrant is characterized by a low internationalization level both in company and 
market. The company in this position is an “early starter” and does not have any relevant 
connection with foreign markets. This condition applies also to the market, that is composed by 
entities that do not have enough knowledge of foreign dynamics to start a dialogue and 
exchange know-how to internationalize. To get enough expertise to start a project abroad, 
companies require resources to be invested and usually it leads to hiring an agent for a foreign 
market similar to the domestic. As Johanson and Mattsson emphasize, the “early starter” get 
some knowledge thanks to the agent and is able to invest directly in the country. 
 
After this stage, the “early starter” becomes a “lonely international”, that is a company 
with a high level of internationalization, not supported by and adequate level of 
internationalization of the market. At this point of its evolution the company is able to carry out 
large networks of relationships in the foreign country, often exchanging information of 
domestic market with foreign players. These relationships allow the firm to expand its 
business activities also in markets different from the domestic one. Because of the low level of 
internationalization of the market, the “lonely international” acts as a spur to increase foreign 
knowledge between domestic competitors. 
 
The third company position of the quadrant is occupied by the “late starter”. Like the early 
starter the late starter has a low level of internationalization, but the maturity of the market 
differs completely. In this case, the market presents a high level of internationalization, which 
put the firm in very disadvantageous position. Indeed, in this case, all the competitors own the 
knowledge and expertise to internationalize, element which lacks in the late starter. However, 
according to Johanson and Mattsson, if the late starter is a SME, it may possess the right 
flexibility and specialization to launch joint ventures operations, finding niche market yet 
unexplored. On the other hand, large companies find themselves in a very complex situation, 
because usually they cannot bear the risks of new venture or new partnerships in a foreign 
country. 
 
If both the company and the environment is characterized by a high degree 
of internationalization, we have an example of an “international among others”. In this case, 
increasing even more the level of internationalization does not bring radical improvement in 
market penetration. On the other hand, international among the others have the task to balance 
the coordination between various foreign market, due to inevitable changes in demand of 




the huge opportunity to spot opportunities and threats in advance. 
Furthermore, an international among others may resort to a vast number of resources and 
relationships, that often result in collaborations and joint ventures. 
 
After having briefly explained how the internationalization process is framed by the network 
model, it is possible also to explain why it has been selected as thesis model. Recent economic 
literature has identified the network model the most relevant model to explain SMEs 
internationalization. SMEs are characterized by a lack of resources and expertise, that do not 
allow them to internationalize. In this sense, the network model allows them to “act and think 
big” (Selz, 1992), overcoming their isolation. This has been confirmed also by the studies 
of Rutashobya and Jaensson, who found the networks and relationships as key for small 
exporting business to internationalize. In Italy, the network model has been demonstrated to be 
an effective theory to explain internationalization of Italian small businesses. According 
to Tavoletti (2011) the model is coherent with Italian management tradition, where thousands 
of small firms build a web of relationships.  Battaglia Corsaro Tzannis (2006) confirmed the 
importance of networks for Italian firms. 
 
 
The new ventures and born-global. 
The rapid changes in business and globalization obliged some firms to adopt a completely 
different approach to internationalization. These firms are not captured by the traditional model, 
which may appear static compared to the new paradigm. These firms are “born global” which 
it means that they expand in foreign market since their birth (Knight and Cavusgil 2004). 
Despite the different names given to them like “global startups” (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994) 
or “infant multinationals” (Lindqvist, 1991), the new phenomena, typical of 21st century SMEs, 
has the following characteristics: 
 
 Global vision from the outset. 
 Previous international experience of the management team. 
 Access to international networks. 
 Technology based firms. 
 Knowledge intensive firm. 




1.3 Entry modes. 
 
The choice of entry mode is one of the most fundamental steps, if not the most important, a 
company overtake in order to internationalize. The entry mode is defined as the process of 
establishing the set of procedures through which the firm transfers its products, resources and 
activities to a foreign market (Root, 1994). Two important reasons shall make companies select 
accurately the entry mode. First of all, it is very costly to reverse (Kumar & Subramanian, 
1997), and as I have previously said, the SME is characterized by a low level of resource 
availability. Secondly, the future of the business will be influenced by this choice, involving a 
large commitment of the company that may result pointed in the wrong direction (Kumar & 
Subramanian, 1997). 
Many pages have been written to explain and describes different entry modes. In this thesis I 
am going to use the modes as provided by Root (1994), one of the most cited authors in this 




 Joint Venture 
 Wholly owned subsidiary 
 
Exporting does not involve the physical presence of the domestic firm on foreign land. It could 
be direct and indirect. The direct way does not require the presence of an intermediary between 
the domestic firm and the foreign market, while the indirect method often consists in a trade 
company who take care of the process on behalf of the domestic firm. 
Licensing is a non-equity contractual mode. The contract is between the licensor (domestic 
firm) and the licensee (foreign firm), with the latter who benefits of following property: patents, 
trademarks, company name, technology, and/or business methods in charge of a fee or a 
percentage of sales. 
Joint venture is an equity entry mode that consists in establishing a venture in the foreign 
country together with a partner who will “split” assets, management activities, profits and 




“knowledge spillover”, due to the inevitable sharing of information and know-how between the 
two partners. 
Wholly owned subsidiary is an equity entry mode that involves the exclusive presence of the 
domestic firm in the foundation of a new venture. While with this method the risk of knowledge 
spillover is avoided, the wholly owned entity will bear a higher risk, due to the lack of foreign 
market knowledge that a partner could have contributed.  
In the selection of the entry modes, the company should differentiate according three 
characteristics (Maigman & Lukas, 1997) (Woodcock, Beamish, & Makino, 1994): 
 Quantity of resource commitment required; 
 Amount of control; 
 Level of technology risk. 
The quantity of resource commitment are the dedicated assets that cannot be employed for other 
uses without incurring costs. Resources may be intangible, such as managerial skills, or 
tangible, such as machines and money. The amount of required resources varies dramatically 
with the entry mode, ranging from almost none with indirect exporting, to minimal training 
costs in licensing, to extensive investments in facilities and human resources in wholly owned 
subsidiaries. 
Control is the ability and willingness of a firm to influence decisions, systems, and methods in 
foreign markets. In a franchise type of licensing agreement, control over the operations is 
granted to the franchisee in exchange for some type of payment and for the promise to abide by 
the terms of the contract. Thus, the licensor has little direct control. In a joint venture control is 
shared formally according to level of ownership, as when equity ownership over 50 percent 
gives one of the partners the largest number of directors on the board. However, informal 
control mechanisms may also be exerted as when one partner possesses and uses knowledge 
and information that the other lacks. Wholly owned subsidiaries are attractive to many 
companies because this mode enables the firm to exert the most control in decision-making. 
Control is the ability and willingness of a firm to influence decisions, systems, and methods in 
foreign markets. In a franchise type of licensing agreement, control over the operations is 
granted to the franchisee in exchange for some type of payment and for the promise to abide by 
the terms of the contract. Thus, the licensor has little direct control. In a joint venture control is 
shared formally according to level of ownership, as when equity ownership over 50 percent 




control mechanisms may also be exerted as when one partner possesses and uses knowledge 
and information that the other lacks. Wholly owned subsidiaries are attractive to many 
companies because this mode enables the firm to exert the most control in decision-making. 
 
Export 
While it is common to see the sale director of an Italian company to manage both domestic and 
foreign sales from Italy, it is not possible in the case of exporting in China. Exporting in China 
requires ad-hoc figures that must be chosen with attention. Indeed, between the Italian firm and 
the Chinese market there is an intermediary, which is located on Chinese land, that “helps” the 
company to find the right distribution channels, set the right promotions and find the right 
business partners. It is a “low-risk” choice that obviously has a negative side. The company 
which resort to the Chinese intermediary has little control on the exportation process and it is 
limited in selecting its own strategy. 
As I have explained in the paragraph related to the entry modes, Italian company basically face 
two choices: being directly present of Chinese land or exporting. Exporting is the most used 
entry modes for Italian SMEs. This choice is characterized by the low risk and investment faced 
by SMEs which have few resources. In fact, if the valuation of the market results wrong, the 
company can always “exit” without notable frictions. 
The exportation in China can be explicated in two ways: direct exportation or indirect 
exportation. The first one has the intermediary on the Italian land, while in the second one the 
intermediary is resident in China. Indirect exportation cannot be considered a real 
internationalization mode, because they do not allow the company to undertake a strategic and 
constant presence in China. However, this choice is suitable for the early stage of 
internationalization, when the company is still moving its first steps in the foreign market. For 




















Export companies are usually companies who belongs to the same supply chain of the 
exporting company. They are chosen by those companies who have a sale office in their 
organization, but lack of an export office. While it is common to see the sale director of an 
Italian company to manage both domestic and foreign sales from Italy, it is not possible in the 
case of exporting in China. Exporting in China requires ad-hoc figures that must be chosen with 
attention. Indeed, between the Italian firm and the Chinese market there is an intermediary, that 
“helps” the company to find the right distribution channels, set the right promotions and find 
the right business partners. It is a “low-risk” choice that obviously has a negative side. The 
company which resort to the Chinese intermediary has little control on the exportation process 
and it is limited in selecting its own strategy. 
Buyers are typically independent sales actors, who keep solid contacts between Italian and 
Chinese firms, helping them to select the right products for the market. They are extremely 
helpful when it is about to export Made in Italy products, that are peculiar and may need 
dedicated assistance when crossing the boarders. They also help exporting companies by 
providing showrooms and verified distribution channels. The great disadvantage of this choice 
is due to the instability of the relationship between the Italian firms and the buyers. Buyers can 
decide in any moment to work for another company, making all the past efforts in building a 












Trading companies are usually big companies who assist not only the mere exportation of the 
Italian good, but also the finance, logistics and distribution behind it. Often, they provide 
feasible analysis and market research for the selected good. 
Brokers behave as link between exporter and importer, offering also advices. Brokers do not 
operate on foreign land and they are not involved directly in the buying and selling process. 
They should not be considered as stable parts of the strategy, because their work is often related 
to batches of products. 
Export consortia are voluntary aggregations of firms operating in the same sectors. They can 
be mono-sectorial or pluri-sectorial, they can be promotional focused or selling focused. 
The direct exportation has the company managing the export process directly in China. The 
majority of the SMEs undertakes this path which is synonym of more stable intentions for 
expansion in foreign market.  The direct exportation can occur in three ways: directly dealing 
with the client, without intermediary; using a structured sale network; using intermediaries. 
In the first case, the company is able not only to manage the sale process, but often provides 
after-sale services. It is the typical case of an e-commerce company. In the second case, the 
company uses a sale network. The network can be direct, that means the presence on foreign 
land of company representatives, who may work with or without a stable representative office. 
The network can also be indirect. In this case the “representatives” are Chinese agents working 
on behalf of the Italian firm. Finally, the direct exporting firm may resort to intermediaries. 
Those intermediaries can be distributors, importers and dealers. Distributors offer the highest 
level of service and they often represent a long-term resource. They are wholesalers who buy 
foreign company’s product (so they own them) and often benefit of an exclusivity agreement. 
The distributor is involved in the logistics and distribution process, has a sale price corridor and 
organizes promotion activities together with the exporting company. The benefits and 
advantages of resorting to the distributor have also some side effects. First of all, the distributor, 
as we have seen, has great control on the price and on the promoting activity related to the 
imported good. The Italian firm should always control its activities in order to check whether 
they are always on the right track. In addition, to work the distributor needs some warranties 
about the exclusivity of the contract. In fact, in many cases the distributor does not trust the 
ability of the Italian firm to control for the absence in China of other second-hand resellers, who 
mine the work of the official one.   
The second intermediary is the importer. Importer is a figure similar to the distributor, but with 




a determined region. Secondly, they usually represent vary foreign companies even of the same 
sectors, with negative effects on the market penetration of a specific good.  
Finally, the dealer is the last intermediary. The dealer also presents many similarities with the 
distributor, with the difference that he is not only a wholesaler but also a retailer. From the 
practice, emerges that dealer is the most difficult figure to “deal” with. Due to their relationship 




When companies deal with foreign and far countries, with high entry barriers, export may not 
be the best choice due to the lack of control. Firms can select a partner and share with it the risk 
of the activity. This is the case of contractual entry modes, where there is no share capital 
involved. The main contractual modes are: 
 International licensing 
 International franchising 
 Piggyback 
 Contract manufacturing or outsourcing 
 Assembly contract and OEM 
 Management contract 
 Turnkey contract 
 Strategic alliances 
 
International licensing is “the process of transferring the rights of a firm’s products to a foreign 
company for the purpose of producing or selling. For a set royalty fee, the licensor allows the 
licensee to use its technology, trademarks, patents, characters and other intellectual property in 
order to gain presence in the markets covered by the license” (The main advantage for SMEs 
lies in the few costs. The Italian firm bears low risk with the possibility of growing quick in the 
foreign market. In addition, the franchisee is usually a firm that already has its network in China, 
so the Italian firm does not have to set up one. Then, the Italian SME can extend the life cycle 
of the product by licensing the technology. It is not uncommon that products that are considered 
“mature” in the domestic market, eventually find new life in foreign markets. The main risk 




a separate company, the licensor may find difficult to control the image positioning of the 
licensee. Indeed, a wrong strategy and comprehension of the market by the Chinese company 
may result in ruining definitely the image of the Italian brand in that market. Furthermore, there 
is big risk also linked to the intellectual property protection. Even if the license contract is 
binding, the licensee can acquire knowledge and insights that may result in transforming the 
licensee in a new competitor. In the following table (table 3) are summed up all the advantages 




Bypassing regulations and tariffs. 
Limited investment in the foreign market. 
Fast market access. 
Risk is mainly taken by the licensee. 
Licensee can suggest marketing adaptations for the local market. 
Licensor can profit from a mature technology. 
Disadvantages 
Licensee acquires technological and marketing skills from the licensor and can become a 
future competitor 
Licensee in an independent entrepreneur: risk of limited control over market and revenues 
for the licensor 
Brand image not homogenous across country countries 
Table 3 Advantages and disadvantages of licensing. Source: Alon, Jaffe, Prange, Vianelli. 
 
 
International franchising is the contract through which “the company (franchisor) enter a 
foreign market by giving to a foreign independent company (franchisee) the right to operate its 
business”. It is a similar contract to licensing, but with greater control for the franchisee 
compared to the licensee. In the case of franchising, the franchisee not only has control on the 
trademark, but also on the production and services activities. If well built, the franchising 
provides a win-win situation for both the players. The franchisor enters a new market with low 
risk, while the franchisee is able to run a well-known business. Even if the franchising is typical 




companies. For example, franchising is still relatively new in China where has been authorized 
only in 2004. Franchising can be direct or indirect. Direct franchising has the domestic 
company, in our case the Italian SMEs which operates from Italy dealing directly with the 
franchisee. The distance, obviously, has an impact on the level of control. This is model A. The 
Italian company, on the contrary, can set up a branch or a subsidiary in China and from it deals 
with the franchisee. Indirect franchising is intermediated by the creation of contractual joint 
venture (strategic alliance) or an equity based joint venture. In the following table (table 4) is 




Relative quick development of store chain. 
Investment is mainly made by the franchisee. 
Greater control than export modes. 
Risk is mainly taken by the franchisee. 
Rapid increase in brand awareness within the country and in different foreign countries. 
Franchisor can gain local market expertise from the franchisee 
Franchisee can suggest marketing adaptations for local market. 
Economy of scale in production. 
Disadvantages 
In some country the legal system is not stable. 
Identification of a good franchisee is not easy. 
Reliability of the relationships with the franchisee. 
High investments to identify the best adaptation of the franchising format in each foreign 
country. 
Limited control over markets and revenues. 
Table 4 Advantages and disadvantages of franchising. Source: Alon, Jaffe, Prange, Vianelli. 
 
 
Piggyback means to be carried by someone. It is the contract with which the domestic company 
“uses” another company which may be domestic (indirect piggyback) or foreign (direct 




weight of the export to a more powerful company. It is a good way for small and medium 
enterprises to approach foreign markets without losing the control of the distribution channel. 
Contract manufacturing (outsourcing) has gathered attention in the recent years due to its 
appealing for foreign companies and the controversy related to the reduction of internal job 
demand. It consists in the production of part of the product or the whole good using cheaper 
labor, present in foreign country. The benefit for the contractor, which is the company which 
outsources production, are related to lower costs and the possibility of entering a foreign market 
with very few investments. On the other hand, outsourcing has raised problems and questions 
related to the production quality. Famous are the case of American multinationals like Nike, 
which have seen their brand damaged by such practices.  
Choosing the outsourcer, it is a very delicate process. The company should select the partner 
by the quality offered, the on-time supply, financial solidity and experience in dealing with 
western companies. However, the risk of having the know-how stolen is quite high. 
Assembly contract is the contract with which the domestic company sends semi-finished 
products abroad to be finished and then takes it back to sell it. 
The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) contract has the domestic company buying 
products that are produced by a foreign firm and subsequently selling it appearing as the official 
producer in the market. 
Under a management contract, a company uses the expertise and knowledge of a foreign 
company for running its business for a set time and fee or percentage of sales. It is very common 
in the hotel sector, where the big chains of the sector use the management contract to allow the 
foreign companies to run the daily hotel operations, without managing ownership, strategic and 
financial decisions. 
Turnkey contracts are called in this way in relation to the readiness of the business. Indeed, 
the turnkey contracts involve operations, design, construction and equipment of large facility 
and often the training of the personnel by a foreign company, which turnover the key to the 
foreign company which has only to run a ready-to-go business. These kinds of contracts are 
carried out by government, which may set general conditions, a corridor in which the exporter 
has the freedom to act (self-engineered turnkey) or may set very specific and strict rules where 
the exporter has no margin of freedom. Of course, in the first case, the liability for the failure 




Finally, there are the strategic alliances, that are contractual (non-equity based) joint ventures. 
In this situation, two players, the foreign and the domestic company share resources to pursue 
a common goal. Usually, the shared resources are trademarks or technology with the aim of 
reaching the same goal as if they were equity based joint venture. However, this operation does 
not result in the constitution of a new company. 
While the advantages for a foreign company are many, the same can be said for the 
disadvantages. Obviously, the contractual joint venture allows the foreign company to 
drastically reduce risk while entering in a new market. The transaction cost can be reduced, and 
own resources can be leveraged with the resources of the other player to reach the goal. 
However, it is common for companies resorting to such mode, to find themselves in conflict 
with each other, due to differences in market power, goal and ability to fulfill their duties. 
 
Equity-based agreements. 
International joint ventures (IJV) are considered one of the most common way for 
internationalizing. They are equity-based, so they represent a form of foreign direct investment 
and has two companies contributing their resources for the constitution of third firm, 
collaborating in the production of goods and services with the intent of achieving a common 
goal. 
The international joint ventures can be vertical or horizontal. The vertical JV there is when 
companies of different sectors cooperate with each other, while the horizontal JV occurs when 
the companies are from the same sector. Another distinction that can be made is on the final 
objective that companies want to achieve. In fact, the JV can be downstream, when companies 
join together to manage upstream activities. On the contrary, the two companies can join to 
work on the downstream of the chain, in the case of a downstream JV.  
Furthermore, the JV can be defined according to the nature of the shared resources. If the 
resources are complementary, in the sense that the two parent companies share different 
resources that only as a whole work for correct running of the operations, the JV will be an X 
model JV. While the companies share the same resources and work together on the same 
“assets”, the JV will be named as Y model JV. 
As seen for the contractual JV, the main challenges to asses if a JV can work shall be made in 
the contractual phase. The differences between the two firms may lead two frictions. The 




 Aim formulation.  
 Cost-benefit analysis. 
 Partner evaluation. 
 Business plan. 
 JV contract. 




















These modes consist in the direct ownership by a foreign company of assets in another country. 
They are foreign direct investment and for this reason are considered riskier than contractual 
modes. However, they assure the highest form of control on operations. 
The simplest form is the representative office (RO). The RO is a solution that allows the 
majority of the firm to set up a business in a foreign country easily and quickly. The RO should 
not be considered as a real equity entity, because it is merely a place in which the company 
carry out market research, without the possibility of generating profits. For that, the company 
R&D Production 
R&D Production Marketing Sales & services 
services 
Marketing Sales & services 
Domestic company 
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Table 5. X model JV. Source: Alon, Jaffe, Prange, Vianelli. 




is forced to set up a branch. It is still an extension of the parent company but can generate 
profits. The sale subsidiary is not considered linked with the parent company and it may 
operate as importer or manage the distribution channel. 
According to the entity of the stake of the foreign investor these entities may be classified in 
this way: 
 Wholly owned subsidiary: the stake is 100% owned by foreign investor. 
 Subsidiary: the foreign investor owns at least 50% of the company. 
 Associate or affiliate: the foreign investor owns less than 50%. 
However, shall always be kept in mind, that the definition provided by this literature are 
overlapping with definition provided by other authors. Furthermore, the clear definition of the 
theory not always has its respective twin in practice. This means that in the case of China, some 
of the options just seen may be united in one investment form. In the second chapter I will go    

















2. Doing business in China. 
 
After having seen the theories and definition related to internationalization, is time to move to 
the practical analysis and see the technical aspects of doing business in China. 
The People’s Republic of China is a state located in Eastern Asia. It is the world most populous 
country with more than 1.4 billion of people and one of the largest with 9,600,000 square 
kilometers. Its capital city is Beijing (21,542,000 dwellers) while the most populous city is 
Shanghai with 24.2 million of inhabitants. 
China’s economy is one of the most flourish in the world. According the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations, China is the second country in the world for 
GDP, with approximately 13.5 trillion of dollars (90 trillion of Yuan). Even if with a declining 
pace with respect of past years, the GDP growth rate is still very high, with 6.1% of growth. 
 
2.1 Recent history of China. 
 
To deeply understand the actual economic and political situation in China, we should take a 
step behind. Explaining and analyzing the last one hundred years history of China is outside the 
scope of thesis, however it is necessary to provide some essential information. As we know, the 
People’s republic of China is a communist country. At least on the paper. Its history RISALE 
at 1949, when the republic was born, after the Chinese Civil War. The undisputed leader of the 
communist party, Mao Zedong, who proclaimed the republic in 1949, found himself to rule an 
extremely backward country, predominantly rural and agriculture based. To bring China in 
modern time, Zedong launched strong campaigns, based on communism and collectivization 
of property, acted to reform the economy. From 1948 to 1959, the collectivization was gradual, 
but not without struggle. To promote the development of heavy industry, Mao decided to 
transform the agriculture in a state monopoly, allowing the party to buy at low prices and sell 
to foreign countries at higher prices, pouring the money surplus in manufacturing. Hence, 
farmers were forced to “spontaneously” accept the collectivization and the requisition of yields.  
This stage brought very few results, with a general lower production of wheat compared to 
previous years with principles of famine in the north of the country. These policies, also known 




of campaigns gone from 1958 to 1963, who saw an even stronger intervention of the state for a 
parallel development of agriculture and industry. As I am going to explain, the consequences 
of these policies were dramatic. 
With the Great Leap Forward, Mao decide to transform the cooperatives into communes. 25000 
communes were founded, each one composed by 5000 families. The communes were self-
sufficient, with farms, schools and canteens. No retribution was needed, and workers were 
payed with “work points”. These communes were also provided with small furnaces, installed 
in the fields, to produce steel. Mao believed in domestic production of steel, based on his blind 
conviction of the power of the mass. He strongly affirmed that China would have been able to 
reach England’s steel production in 15 years. Obviously, the mass of poor people in the land, 
without any knowledge of metallurgy and with low quality furnaces, was able to produce only 
unusable steel. However, the toll they had to pay was very high. Millions of farmers were 
deployed to realize and operate the furnaces, with high pression coming from the party. Doors, 
furniture, kitchen’s tools and metal bed bases were requisitioned to be burned in the furnaces. 
The belief in the power of the mass led to other questionable campaigns. Great works aimed to 
improve the floodgates of Yellow River and to build systems of dams and irrigation channels. 
Again, the inexperience of the workers, who were mainly poor farmers, brought tremendous 
results, with the addition of the impossibility for them to cultivate the land, due to the 
infrastructural projects in which they were deployed. 
The absence of the farmers from the land, to produce steel and build infrastructures, which 
characterized the Great Leap Forward did not improved the productivity. Indeed, it is 
acknowledged as the main cause of the famine which stroke China from 1959 to 1962, who 
caused the death of 14 million of Chinese, according the national sources, who were probably 
more according international sources. 
The negative results of the abovementioned policies started to crack the leader position of Mao 
inside the party. Internal opponents like Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi raised their voices 
against Mao’s leadership, guilt of damaging Chinese people life condition. To restore a central 
position in the party, Mao counterattacked, accusing his rivals of having lost the orthodoxy of 
the Marxist-Leninist thought. He, so, initiated the Great Cultural Revolution, a period gone 
from 1966 to 1976, characterized by the incitement to the population to criticize and oppose the 
party’s member who showed too much “embourgeoisement”. Ended with Mao’s death, the 
cultural revolution was able to eliminate the political opposition using the power and the will 




moved by the words of the Red Book of Mao, attacked any symbols of the communist China 
different from Mao’s vision. 
The death of Mao Zedong represented the end of an era. The control of the party over people’s 
life diminished and gradually led to economic reforms. After Zedong, the role of leader was 
taken by Deng Xiaoping, who opted for a “softer” version of communism. He started a process 
of privatization of the fields, imposing also dual system for state-owned enterprise which 
implied both market and governmental prices. The good result of privatization of agriculture, 
who raised production by 25% between 1975 and 1985, allowed other sectors to undertake the 
same road. State-owned enterprise flourished and at the beginning of the 80s, the first private 
companies were born. It is important to remember the Open-Door Policy of 1978, through 
which the party allowed foreign business to set up in China. Special areas were destined to 
those firms, areas that will become the center of the Chinese economic engine. 
For all the 80s, Deng laid the foundation for what will be called in 1992 “Socialist market 
economy” by Jiang Zemin.  After Deng’s death, the same route was overtaken by his successors, 
Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, who were reformers. Tariffs and trade barrier were reduced, and 
China joined the World Trade Organization. During the 80s and the 90s its GDP grown of 9.4%, 
from 150 billion in 1978 to more than $1.6 trillion in 2004. 
A change of route was carried out by president Hu Jintao in 2005, who presented ambiguous 
positions. His government was centered on the continuous search for harmony. He believed that 
Chinese economy should not have grown “at all costs”, instead he prompted for the economic 
equilibrium, many times investing on those sectors of the population left behind by the 
economic push of the previous years. He is remembered for his management of the SARS crisis 
in Hong Kong in 2003, based on “hiding” the problem from western eyes, a choice that 
eventually led to a worsening of the situation and the difficulty in controlling the disease. 
Xi Jinping succeeded to Hu Jintao in 2013 and since then he is the president of PRC. He created 
the expression “the Chinese dream” as contraposition of the American dream. The meaning of 
the expression is related to the birth of a Chinese standard of living in the world, like the 
American did in the last century.  
He planned and dreamed of the transformation of the Chinese state in a modern state, similar 
to the western powers, as working example of the supremacy of the socialist capitalism. Even 
if the Chinese dream is always “attached” to the concepts of propaganda and nationalism, Xi 
Jinping had the merit to imagine the exportation of the “Chinese way” abroad. Indeed, the recent 




However, Xi Jinping currently faces many problems. The increasing difficulty in bringing 
together all the Chinese under one ideology, led to strong policies of censorship and active 
propaganda. In the years of social media and perpetual connection, such policies appear as a 
strong step behind for a country that as the will to impose its way of thinking all over the world. 
Furthermore, the protests in a city such Hong Kong (that technically is part of China since 1997 
but still has a strong western identity) may carry a “germ” that, if not treated properly, can be 
spread all over China. 
Finally, the slowing down of the economic growth, that seems natural and unavoidable looking 
at Chinese history of continuous growth, set new questions and doubts for the economy, that 
has to show to the world its ability to be dynamic in such changing contest. 
 
 
2.2 State of Chinese economy. 
 
It is common thought between the international analysts that Chinese economy is slowing down. 
According McKinsey, Chinese GDP is “cooling” with a growth rate of only 6.6%, the lowest 
value since the 1990. This new soften growth, that is believed to continue also next year, 
represent a challenge for a country that is not used to this slow pace and so it will be forced to 
find new way of balancing itself in the new state.  
Behind this slowdown there are different factors. Consumption must be mentioned. Chinese 
consumption behavior has radically changed during the last years. Newspaper and international 
media had highlighted and showed the world a general plunge in multinationals and big 
companies’ sales, but in truth what we are seeing is a shift toward new pattern of consumption.  
Firstly, consumption is still a strong driver of growth for Chinese economy. Forecasts estimate 
a growth by about 6 trillion of dollars from now to 2030. This enormous sum is equivalent to 
the combined consumption growth expected in the US and Western Europe over the same 
period, double that of India, and ASEAN economies together.  
The abovementioned changes, concern mostly the retail sales, which have seen a drop in 
particular in the automotive and cosmetic sector. According the China Passenger Car 
Association, the drop of vehicle sales has reached the 6.6% since 2018 and it is showing any 
sign of trend inversion. This is mainly due to stronger regulations in terms of pollution and 




which has seen a reduction of governmental incentives. Service sector still represent the future 
of Chinese economy, with a contribution to GDP of 60%. The same can be said for online sales, 
which grew at a strong 24%.  
The changes in consumption pattern is even stronger if we look at lower tier cities. These cities 
are generally poorer than tier 1 cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen), and, as the 
last world economic crisis teaches us, in a slowdown situation who are affected the most are 
the poorer. Consequently, lower market segment stores, as the discount Pinduoduo, are 
increasingly becoming a reality in China, showing excellent results in terms on online sales. 
Another factor that is contributing to the economy slowdown is the uneasy access to credit. 
Since 2016 the government started a campaign of regulations aimed to reduce the easy access 
to credit that produced asset bubbles and excess of liquidity. Furthermore, years of 
deregulations after the financial crisis brought phenomena known as shadow banking and peer 
to peer lending, which have been blocked after the 2016. For these reasons, the access of credit 
registered a decrease in terms of growth from 17% of 2017 to 7% of 2018. Recently, the 
government is moving toward new ways of opening the credit tap, but more slowly compared 
to the after-crisis years, because small enterprises and companies in the lower tier cities are 
suffering the most. 
Concluding, to understand the develop of Chinese economy, is crucial to study the signals of 
the next year. At the moment the China is at a fork: at one side the possibility of relaunching 
the economy, while at the other the possibility of a round of consolidation. For the foreign 
multinational both the cases could represent an opportunity, entering and opening new markets 
or “eating” the competition of companies caught in the credit squeeze. 
 
2.3 Chinese Economy drivers. 
 
In this paragraph, I tried to highlight what are the sectors that are driving the Chinese economy 
and that will drive it in the future. 
 
Manufacturing. 
The workshop of the world, this is the name that often in given to China when talking about its 
manufacturing sector. About 30% of the working population is employed in manufacturing, 




The communist history of China has a strong influence on the sector. The focus on Chinese 
production has always been on quantity more than quality. This attitude, very often 
accompanied by government subsidies, has led to problems of over capacities that still affect 
the industry. 
Smart manufacturing needs a separated mention. According to many analysts it may represents 
the key aspect for China to reach the world technology supremacy, with the United States forced 
to “pass the torch” to the Asian colossus. This drastic change does not involve only China, but 
more in general Asian countries. South Korea and Japan are pushing for the development of 
artificial intelligence technologies, with investments in the order of billions of dollars. The same 
for Singapore, which is planning to invest 100 million of dollars in this technology. 
United States simply cannot keep up with the level of cooperation between Asian companies. 
This element has always characterized China and other Asian countries, where it was and is 
possible to see great level of cooperation between both between companies and government 
and companies. The joint operations between Baidu and Xiaomi for the development of IoT 
and artificial intelligence uses is a perfect example. 
According to a report from Deloitte, the main area of development of smart manufacturing are: 
 Digital factory. 
 In-depth extraction of equipment and user value. 
 Industrial IoT. 
 Business model restructuring. 
 Artificial intelligence (AI). 
 
With the term digital factory is meant the digital management of data resulting from the 
manufacturing process, from the beginning to its end. Thank to modern technology, the process 
can be optimized to respond promptly to changes and dynamic allocation of resources.  
Three types of data are at the center of the development of digital factories: 
 
 Production process data. This data is generated between the “communication” of 
resources management software and on-field machines. The data coming from these 
exchanges allows to monitor constantly possible deviation from the standards and to 





 Product data flows. These data cover the whole lifecycle of a product. Are essential, not 
only for understanding the habits and decisions of consumers, but also for designing 
new products that are more satisfying for the user and in less time. In addition, the 
presence of sensors and other connectivity tools, allows the construction of advanced 
after sale services. 
 
 Supply chain data. This aspect is a sort of evolution of the latter. It is like stretching the 
collection of data to the entire value chain, from the resource acquirement to the 
interaction with the final user. The main result of this data is the construction of cross-
enterprises platform carrying analytics about all the steps the product encounters. 
 
The “in-depth extraction of equipment and user value” represents the new and constant research 
of manufacturing firm to extract new value from the clients. Due to very high competition and 
transparent price policies, the only route for manufacturing firm is to provide high level of 
customization or advanced after sale services. Being able to highly customize your car or 
providing predictive maintenance and 24h assistance is good example of the overall direction 
of manufacturing firms. This search does not apply only to clients, but also to equipment. 
Advanced analytics provide everything a producer should know on the exact value each 
component provides, whether it should provide more and whether it could be optimized. 
All of this is possible thanks to IoT sensors, that keep the equipment “talking” 24h. This is 
especially true in sectors like the automotive one, where heavy use of assets is required, but 







Table 7. Application of typical IoT-related technologies. Source: Deloitte 
 
 
The massive presence of data and information allows the firm to rapidly adapt their business 
model thanks to insights that before were unthinkable. 
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Table 8 Future Business Model Positioning. Source: Deloitte. 
 
 
Finally, one of the protagonists of the smart manufacturing revolution in China is artificial 
intelligence. The Deloitte survey shows that half of the firms interviewed is already using 
artificial intelligence to improve the precision of the production line. 
Indeed, the main advantages of AI in this sector lies on the ability of building intelligent 
predictions, making the machine “to think” which is the best way to produce. Again, statistical 
analysis and machine learning are fundamental to reach such forecasts, and the only way to get 
them is through sensors and data. Through an ongoing connection. 
Although it may sound revolutionary, the development of AI for manufacturing is still in its 
early stage. The main problems companies are facing are due to the lack of precedents and 
business cases and a general comprehension of the subject. The whole ecosystem is still in 
formation and the progress are made for the promise of future benefits more than present fruits. 
For example, Chinese pharmaceutical companies, that are not characterized for massive use of 
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The service sector. 
The service sector represents a huge part of the Chinese economy. It represents the 50% of 
Chinese GDP and it has still room for expansion. From 2016 to 2018, the service providers 
have seen an annual increase in revenues of 13.3% with the service sector employees being 
46.3% of the total workforce in 2018. 
Nowadays the sector is living moment of doubt, after the expansion of the recent years. The 
2018 has seen a decline of services and many analysts think the future holds a re-balancing 
moment more than a further expansion. 
While the numbers show a strong impact of the service sector on the health of Chinese economy, 
it still lags the one of developed countries, with productivity of 20-50% of the OECD countries. 
Large part of the development of the sector will be linked to the satisfaction of new needs 
arising from consumers, that are becoming year after year, more sophisticated. Domestic brands 
are not always Chinese first choice because they are perceived as cheap and lacking safety. 
Furthermore, the service sector is strictly connected to manufacturing in China. The recent 
slowdown of manufacturing has hit also the service sector, with a general decline of the whole 
supply chain, from the logistic to the retail store. The migration of value outside of China will 
likely continue, due to the trade war with US, and the sector that will probably face the worst 
consequences is the logistic one. Even if in the short-run the logistic will flourish because of 
the migration itself, in the long-run it will left alone with a domestic manufacturing sector not 
strong as in the past. 
The remedy to solve the doubt related to the sector should come from the policy maker. To 
adjust the growth trajectory of the sector, new stimulus is required to boost consumers’ demand 
and to allow the intervention of private players.  
A separated mention is needed to go further in the ITC sector of China. Indeed, the Chinese 
digital economy is believed by many being the key of success for the world dominance between 
the US. According many analysists the technology war against US, has already been won by 
Beijing. 
In 2008, Chinese digital economy accounted for 15% of GDP. In 2017 the value was 33%. This 
increase has been due mainly to the integration of ITC technologies with “traditional” sectors 
like finance, entertainment and manufacturing. 
The definition of digital economy can be meant ins a narrow or broader way. The narrow way 




etc. The broader definition includes the previous one plus extension of the traditional sectors 
that have been touched by ITC (like the digital manufacturing mentioned in the previous 
paragraph). The OECD usually uses the narrow definition, which measures the digital economy 
at 6% of Chinese GDP. On the other hand, a broader conception of ITC shows the digital 




Table 9. China's Digital Economy. Source: China Academy of Information and Communication Technology. 
 
 
While these numbers do not reward China and rank the country 50th on 131 countries based on 
the World Bank digital adoption index, the reality shows leadership of China in some 
technological sectors that could potentially mine US hegemony. In addition, according to 
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The main expansion sectors of Chinese ITC are: 
 E-commerce. Online Chinese transactions represents 40% of global online transactions, 
with a domestic penetration of 15% (U.S. accounts a penetration of only 10%). 
 
 Fintech. The amount of online payments and the processing capacity of such payments 
is much greater than the US one. In 2016, online payments were 11 times the payments 
in United States with a processing capacity three times greater than the American one 
(comparing Alibaba with American leader company). 
 
Furthermore, Chinese leadership in these two sectors has allowed an international expansion in 
various sub-sectors: 
 Alipay and WeChat Pay, the most famous third-party payment applications in China are 
available in 28 countries outside China for Chinese tourists. 
 
 Alibaba is present in more than 200 countries with a growth in terms of revenues of 
200%. In addition, it promoted the economic development of the general industry 
investing in foreign providers in other countries. 
 
 
 Alibaba cloud computing has 14 data center all around the world with revenues growing 
of 400%. 
 
One of the key factors for such a rapid and disruptive expansion can be found in the government 
policies in favor of innovation. From the early stages of this expansion, the Chinese state has 
pushed for a light regulation. Big public investments and little concern for data privacy have 
also boosted the development of ITC. 
Another important factor is the demographic composition and intern access. China has a large 
population of internet users (700 million) and 282 million of digital natives, eager and willing 
to be first adopter of new technologies. If we compare the number of users who access the 
internet in India, a country with similar population, we can see that India has 60% of internet 





2.4 Belt and Road Initiative or the new Silk Road. 
 
The Belt and Road Initiative, often referred as BRI or OBOR, is an international project 
promoted by the Chinese government with the official aim to improve its commercial links with 
Eurasia countries. As a modern “silk road” it includes two routes: Silk Road Economic Belts, 
that are the overland routes for road and rail transportation, and the Maritime Silk Roads that 
which consists in sea routes. 
The initiative was announced during a visit of Xi Jinping at the Indonesian Parliament in 
October 2013. The plan is aimed to "to construct a unified large market and make full use of 
both international and domestic markets, through cultural exchange and integration, to enhance 
mutual understanding and trust of member nations, ending up in an innovative pattern with 
capital inflows, talent pool, and technology database." The main priority is to reduce the 
infrastructural gap of some of the countries involved (especially in Asia and Africa), hence, 
accelerating their economic growth. 
The capital request for such project is enormous. Addressing in total 65 countries which 
represent the 40% of world GDP and 65% of world population, the initiative requires 900 billion 
of U.S. dollar to be realized. Forty billion of this money will come from the Silk Road Fund 
(China Investment Corporation, Export and Import Bank, China Development Bank). Other 
money will come from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), of which Italy is a 
member with a number of shares of two billion of U.S. dollars. 
Many representatives of the media called the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese version of 
the Marshall Plan. While it is undoubted that such a reference has a huge mediatic impact, it is 
needed to go further in the analysis. A study carried out by Simon Shen and Wilson Chan 
analyze five elements of both projects to see when the two differ and when they follow a similar 
path. The five elements analyzed are: boosting exports, exporting currency, countering a rival, 
fostering strategic division, siphon away diplomatic support. 
 
 Boosting exports. At the end of World War II, United States was a strong manufacturing 
country which faced a possible stagnation of the economy due to the saturation of 
domestic markets. With the Marshall Plan, U.S. “forced” European states to import 
American products as U.S investments. Something similar happened after the global 
crisis. China, which always had an economy focused on exporting goods in western 




for new engines for growth. However, the negative economic conditions in the West 
made impossible to boost consumption of goods, as during the Marshall Plan. Hence, 
China focused on structural investments and infrastructure. 
 
 Exporting currency. With the Marshall Plan, United States was able to impose the dollar 
as an international and stable currency. After the war, there was a general consensus 
about the lack of a strong international value, able to support the reconstruction of the 
damaged countries. While some economist proposed the return of the Great Britain 
Pound, Great Britain was heavily indebted with a declining empire, so the dollar that 
was adequately backed by gold ended up as the obvious choice. China is only partly 
trying to do the same. At the moment the RMB is heavily a “domestic” currency, with 
almost no use outside China. In addition, even if Beijing is spreading its currency in 
“less western” countries, which are less under the influence of the dollar (Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), it also true the China is 
imposing strict controls on capital circulation discouraging the global adoption of RMB. 
Finally, even if there is no capital control, imposing a value as international currency 
nowadays is very difficult, because the globalized western world is too attached to the 
“American way” with the dollar as backbone of the capitalistic society. 
 
 Fighting a rival. At the end of World War II, communism was vastly appreciated 
between European people. The main actor on the European scene during the war was 
URSS, who fought Germans with the highest toll to pay. In conditions of economic 
instability many countries would have fallen under the URSS influence, so the Marshall 
Plan represented a way to export USA capitalism and politic vision of the world, against 
Russian one. In the specific case of modern China, there is no such direct rivalry. 
According many analysts China knows that at the moment is weight on the global scene 
is still secondary compared to USA, so its behavior is pragmatic and does not exclude 
possible collaborations. 
 
 Fostering strategic division. The presence of Iron Curtain and the clear division of 
western Europe and Eastern Europe is mainly due to the Marshall Plan. As already 
stated early, the Marshall Plan represented wellness and cooperation for European 




European Union as we know it is the result of the Marshall Plan and the US, which 
eventually won against US. So, the Plan fostered strategic division (together with the 
military presence of the NATO) who resulted in attracting the east with the fall of USSR. 
It is possible to say that the New Silk Road is trying to do the same in several way. It is 
trying to lower the stability of Asia-Pacific organizations, which are led by US and 
Japan. Furthermore, China has undertaken several actions with the Visegard Four 
(Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia), that are European countries which do 
not play a center role in EU. 
 
 Siphon away diplomatic support. All that have been said, make the Marshall Plan as the 
perfect “leverage” to convince and attract non-capitalist countries to join the US 
alliance, with the exchange of aid. The BRI does more or less the same. It points weak 
countries, who feel no longer on the same path of US and which felt strong and long 
economic crisis, and basically offer them a new “standard”. 
 
The initiative has collected divergent opinions. In March 2019, Italy has been the first G7 
country to sign the memorandum to join the new Silk Road initiative, with Luigi Di Maio as 
promoter of the project. According to him, Italy needs this kind of partnerships to boost Italian 
export toward China, while many analysts are of contrary opinions. The main concern is related 
to the ambiguous role of China. From one point of view, Beijing is surely a strong commercial 
partner, but as also the UE stated, China represents a competitor, a rival in the race for the world 
economy dominance. Alberto Forchielli, founder of Mandarin Capital, stated that the 
significance of the Italian participation is more related to the symbolic consequences more than 
the economic ones. According to the economist, Italy is in dangerous position because with this 
open move, it is sympathizing with a declared anti-American vision of the world. USA and 
NATO are still important partners to Italy, which now is at risk of being isolated in G7.  
The economic aspect is secondary because at the center there is the political centrality of China 
in the global economy. China is already buying European and western assets; it does not need 
the “permission” of western countries. After the European recession, some countries like 
Greece has struggled to shown signs of recovery. This has led the perfect circumstances for 
China to buy in Europe at low price. Indeed in 2010, COSCO (which is controlled by the 
Chinese government) rented the port of the Piraeus for 35 years, making the port the Chinese 




In relation to this contraposition between China (eastern world) and USA (western world), 
Forchielli has described a new state of the globe that is becoming year after year more relevant. 
It is the “decoupling” that is the splitting and the consequent creation of a new supply chain. 
According to him, while until the early years of 2000 the world has seen a positive general 
acceptance of globalization, with vast and long value chain, after the global crisis the scent of 
cold war has returned. United States (and their historic allies with them) found themselves in a 
disadvantageous position against the economic and technology power of China. Considered for 
years just as a low-cost country for manufacture, China absorbed western knowledge and 
silently implemented its own business and technology, until the point to menace the historical 
American dominance. 
Nowadays, with Chinese aggressive internationalization, western company should be 
suspicious in dealing with Beijing. This sense of suspect will inevitably lead to separated supply 
chain, with western companies no longer supplying in China, forced to find better and cheaper 
way in other countries. According to Forchielli, probably it is too late. If the situation is bad for 
United States, let alone Italy. Chinese supremacy for the 5G technology shows how it could be 
too late to totally avoid relations with China, therefore USA and European countries should 
now be aware of possible Beijing interference in domestic affairs. 
 
 
2.5  Starting a business. 
 
When facing the laws and procedures related to setting up a business in China, we should have 
in mind that there is a substantial overlapping between Chinese Company Law and the Foreign 
Investment Law (that, as we will see later has been recently updated). 
Without considering yet the Foreign Investment Law, it is possible to state that the main two 
form for doing business in China are companies and partnerships. 
Companies may be of two types: 
 
 Limited Liability Companies (LLC), which is the most common form used by Chinese 
and foreign investors. This typology of business implies a “shield” between the assets 
of the owners and the assets of the company, which is considered as a separate legal 




The regulatory regime is more loose compared to JSLC, and the ownership can be easily 
transferred by transferring the shares. 
 The Joint Stock Limited Companies (JSLC) which are similar to LLC but requires more 
stringent regulatory regime. 
 
Partnerships may be of three types: 
 
 General partnership, which are formed by general partners which are fully liable 
together with the company, which not provide the above-mentioned “asset shield”. 
 Limited partnership, which are formed by general partners, fully liable together with the 
partnership, and limited partners, liable only for the part of share capital contributed. 
 Special general partnership, which is similar to the general partnership but consists in 
professional service institutions providing a service requiring professional knowledge. 
Furthermore, the general partners of the special general partnership are shielded and 
liable only for the contributions they made. 
 
For the specific case of constitution of Chinese company by foreign investors there is the 
Foreign Investment Law, that is a new law adopted on March 2019 and effective from January 
2020. In the next paragraph we will see the main differences and benefits provided by the new 
law, which substituted the following law: 
 
 Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (Equity JV Law). 
 Law on Sino-Foreign Contractual Joint Ventures. 
 Law on Foreign-Capital Enterprises. 
 
The main entry modes studied at the beginning of this thesis, find a concrete application in 
China in the following forms, that are, at the moment, the main investment form for a foreign 
investor. The options are 
 Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise. 
 Joint Venture. 




Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise (WFOE). 
The most used form to set up a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) is the LLC. As the 
name states, these kinds of companies are formed for their entirety by foreign capital. Because 
they are usually LLC, they benefit from the separation of liability and asset shielding, making 
the foreign investor liable only for what he contributed. 
The procedures for the constitution are complex and can be divided in pre-registration, the 
procedures before the company comes into existence in China and post-registration, the 
procedures that take place after the birth of the company. 
Pre-registration procedures: 
 
1. Company name registration. The name of the company must be in Chinese and it can 
be translated by another language phonetically and literally. The English name is not 
binding for Chinese law. 
The name chosen will be verified by Administration of Industry and Commerce and 
must include four elements: name, industry, location and entity form. 
 
2. Approval certificate and temporary business license. The authorities will release a 
temporary business license after having assessed: the certificate of incorporation, a letter 
from the investor’s bank assessing the stability of investor’s financial status, photocopy 
of passport and photos of the legal representative of the investor company. 
The assessment will cover not only information related to the investor but also 
information about the constituting company. Indeed, it will be analyzed: Name of the 
company, business scope, registered capital, business term, lease contract, CVs, 
photocopies and passports of directors (in the case of a board there should be a minimum 
of 3 directors and a maximum of 13), feasibility study report, articles of association and 
environmental protection evaluation report (if applicable). 
 
After having obtained the temporary business license, the newborn company must go through 






1. Tax registration. 30 days from the obtainment of the business license, the company must 
file the tax registration form and the initial tax reporting form. The filing can occur at 
the state taxation bureau or at the local taxation bureau. After the fulfilment of the 
procedure, the company will be able to issue invoices (fapiao). 
This is also the moment win which trading and manufacturing company must apply for 
import and export duties. 
2. Application for seals. In China companies use chops as company signature. The chop 
should be required and should be assigned to the company representatives. 
3. Opening of bank account. Finally, the last step requires the opening of a bank account. 
The bank could be also foreign and should provide two accounts: a foreign currency 
account and RMB account. 
 
 
The total duration of the process may vary, but in general the timing is the following: 
 
Company name approval: 5-10 days 
Certificate of name approval issuance: 5-10 days 
Company registration: 30-60 days 
Opening Bank Account: 10-14 days 
Capital injection: 3-5 days 
Tax account registration (including third party agreement), can be done at the same time as 
bank account opening: 60-90 days 
 
 
Joint Venture (JV) 
Joint Venture are usually LLC. As we have already seen in the entry mode paragraph, joint 
ventures consist in two companies joining together their resources to pursue a collective goal. 
In China a joint venture is identified when a foreign shareholder owns more than 25% of shares 




business in China. However, due to the uncertainty related to IP protection, in recent years the 
western companies are setting up with WFOE.  
The advantages of adopting the JV as investment form are mainly two. Firstly, with the JV is 
possible to access markets and sectors otherwise forbidden to a WFOE. By consulting the PRC 
Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue is possible to asses which sectors require 
mandatorily a Sino-foreign equity company or a contractual JV. Secondly, JV brings vary 
benefits for western companies, that can rely on already consolidated distribution channels, 
knowledge about the markets and government relationships. 
The registered capital for such investment is stated in the articles of associations of the 
company. The 15% must be deposited in a bank in the following three months since the 
obtainment of the business license. The minimum legal requirement is: 
 
 30.000 RMB (€ 3922,76) if the JV is formed by two or more foreign investors. 
 100.000 RMB (€ 13075,85) if the JV has only one foreign shareholder. 
 
The timing required to set up a JV goes from 4 to 6 months. As for the WFOE, the registration 
process is articulated in a pre-registration phase and a post-registration phase. The pre-
registration phase consists in: 
 Selecting the name and applying for it at the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce. 
 Obtaining the certificate of approval of JV from Ministry of Commerce or Foreign 
Economic Cooperation Bureau (MOFEC) 
 Applying for business license at SAIC. 
 
After having obtained the license, which is temporary the newborn company proceeds to: 
 Obtaining the chops (company’s signature). 
 Obtaining import and export license. 
 Obtaining tax certificate. 
 Opening bank account in foreign currency and RMB. 
 Applying for permanent business license. 




Representative Office (RO). 
Representative offices are the “lightest” investment option between the three. They do not imply 
the constitution of a legal form and hence they do not require a minimum capital investment. 
Furthermore, the RO can choose between a physical office or a virtual one.  
These advantages come with many limitations. The RO cannot run business activities in the 
traditional way. In fact, it can only carry out marketing research or quality control operations, 
delegating the rest to the parent company outside Chinese border. Because of this, RO cannot 
issue invoices and generate profits. 
Representative offices cannot hire directly, but they resort to government recruiting agency, 
and have the limitation of 4 foreign employees as maximum. Further requirements for the 
constitution are: 
 
 The foreign company shall exist for at least two years before the constitution of the RO. 
 The foreign company must sign a lease contract for the office for a minimum of 12 
months. 
 The name of the RO must follow the following criteria: nationality + Chinese name of 
foreign enterprise + name of the place where the office is located + representative office. 
 
The procedure to set up the representative office are simple compared to the process for WFOE 
and JV. However, it is similar and follow the same steps. 
 










 WFOE RO JV 
Setup time 3-6 months 2-3 months 3-6 months 













Scope Trading, Consulting 
or Manufacturing 




Office Physical Physical/virtual Physical 
Hiring capacity Direct hiring Hiring via gov. 
office (max 4 foreign 
employees 
Direct hiring 
Tax VAT, EIT, local 
taxes and levies, 
taxes depending on 
the business, 
transaction taxes 
VAT, EIT, local 
taxes and levies 
VAT, EIT, local 
taxes and levies, 
taxes depending on 
the business, 
transaction taxes 
Bank account RMB and foreign RMB RMB and foreign 
Invoicing Invoicing from 
China 
Not allowed Invoicing from 
China 
Receiving payments Allowed Not allowed Allowed 
Table 10. Comparison between different Investment form. Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
 
2.6  Government interference. 
 
As we have seen in the paragraph dedicate to the modern history of China, after Mao’s death 
the country opened to a period of “de-privatization” and more freedom of business, attracting 




With the election of the current president in 2012, Xi Jinping, a robust change of course 
occurred. It is important to bear in mind that China has always been a communist country, in 
which even in the “freest” time, the state always tried to play a role inside private companies. 
But after Xi election, the approach of the party became more invasive. 
The general trend shows the will of the party to blur the distinction between private and state-
owned firms, also for what concerns definition and regulations. In 2017, the party obliged big 
national firms to take into account the party by inserting it into the articles of association. The 
same thing happened for all listed companies (at home and abroad) in 2018. Furthermore, in a 
recent survey made by Central Organization Department emerged that 68% of China’s private 
companies had party bodies by 2016, and 70% of foreign enterprises. 
The recent affair between USA and Huawei is the perfect example of this state of interference. 
The national intelligence law of 2017 states that “any organization or citizen shall cooperate in 
national intelligence work”. Enough to alarm western countries and in particular United States, 
for a potential activity of espionage outside China’s border. 
This burden affects also foreign companies. From Disney, to Walmart to Dow Chemicals, each 
of them has a party committee to which respond. In 2017, an article by Reuters stated that many 
of the members’ committee wanted also to be incorporated in the executive committee and also 
wanted the firms to pay their expenses. And it should be clear that these companies do not have 
choice. If even BAT, i.e. Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent, the three behemoths of Chinese economy, 




2.7  Relevant law for foreign businesses. 
 
Foreign Investment Law 
Promulgated on March 15, 2019 to take effect on January 1, 2020, the Foreign Investment Law 
(FIL) is generally welcomed by international analysts. It aims to solve important problems and 
uncertainties for foreign invested companies, like technology transfer and protection of 
intellectual properties. The FIL will replace the three existing PRC laws on foreign investment 
passed between 1979 and 1990, namely the Law on Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Ventures (EJV 




Foreign Owned Enterprises (WFOE Law). The EJV Law and CJV Law collectively are referred 
to as JV Laws, together with WFOE Law, form the three FDI Laws). Even if it should be 
recognized the importance of the three FDI laws, with passing of time, they showed their 
limitation especially because of discrepancies between the laws and the national Company Law. 
In this sense the FIL represents the will of unifying the system and ruling the foreign companies 
under the Company Law. 
Here I present a list of the main articles: 
Article 4: Foreign investors will be treated not less favorably than national investors in the fund 
access stage, unless in the specified areas of Market Access Negative List. 
Article 16: It is granted to foreign invested companies to present projects for public tenders 
Article 17: Foreign companies con issue shares, bonds or other financial instruments to fund 
operations 
Article 22: It prohibits any administrative agency or its staff to force technology transfer from 
foreign companies operating in China. 
Article 23: Every governmental agency shall protect industrial and commercial secrets of 
foreign companies 
Article 26: It provides complain tools to foreign investors 
Article 39: The State will punish public staff who abuse of their authority, neglect their duties, 
abuse of their power for personal return or disclose commercial secrets of foreign companies 
or other. In case of crime, the government will search the criminal liability according to the 
existing laws. 
Article 40: For any country or region which overtake prohibitive or restrictive measures toward 
PRC, PRC can overtake corresponding measures against the abovementioned country. 
 
While these articles surely have the potential to boost foreign investment in China, FIL brought 
with itself a halo of vagueness. It is clear that will change the managerial organization of some 
companies, especially joint ventures, but it is not specified what will happen in the case of 
missed deal between Chinese and foreign actors of the ventures. It states that tools for protecting 
foreign investors will be present with the possibility of complaining, but not very much is said 




So, it will be necessary to wait and see how FIL will be interpreted, to see whether it will be a 




Foreign Investment Negative List 
An important step forward is also due to the Foreign Investment Negative List, a list that 
provides a series o business sectors prohibited to foreign investments. The list has been reduced 
compared with the past and new business sectors are now open to foreign firms. 
Important progress has been made for what concerns service industry. It has been deleted the 
restriction through which was impossible for foreign actors to control national maritime agents; 
also the gas and pipe for heating sector is now more open than in the past; limitations have been 
removed for the store-and-forward, call center and domestic communication; finally, it is easier 
to access the agriculture, mining and manufacturing sectors. 
The new series of rules provide important elements also for what concern investments that are 
encouraged. The sectors who benefit are mainly high technological and ecological ones, with 
particular importance, information electronics and components for 5G communications. 
 
 
2.8 Funding access and Investments in China. 
 
To fully understand the dynamics behind the economic framework of China, it is necessary to 
study the “outbound” trend of money, that is made by the Chinese foreign direct investment in 
Europe.  
The history of Chinese investment in Europe, it characterized by a rapid expansion in terms of 
money invested during the last decade. The peak was reached in 2016, with an overall 
investment in Europe of 37 billion of dollars. After that year, the trend was down going with 
30 billion in 2017 and 17 billion in 2018. The 2018 levels represent the lowest level since 2014, 




represented also the first year of “big sales” of European assets owned by Chinese, with 




Table 11. Chinese FDI in Europe. Source: Rhodium Group. 
 
The reasons behind this shrinking of investments are known and can be mainly found at 
“home”. The first reason of declining investment is linked to the capital control imposed by 
Beijing, with the aim of stabilizing the yuan.  
The second reason is related to the negative sentiment and backlash against Chinese business, 
developed in the recent years, especially after Trump’s election at the White House. Many 
European countries have built and implemented more strict regulation for what concerns the 
screening of foreign investment. While small economies are revaluating the positive effect of 
Chinese initiatives, like the Road and Belt program, the European powers are more concerned 
by national security implication of a strong Chinese presence in their economies, due to the 
strong hand of Beijing government (hence military and security bureau) in Chinese companies’ 
businesses.  
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Beside the above mentioned shrinking that characterized the FDI coming from Beijing, the 
Chinese portfolio is still rich and diversified.  
The main target countries are still the “Big Three” economies: UK, Germany and France. 
Investments in those countries represents the 45% of total investments, but they have seen a 
deep decline compared to 2017 where the Big Three part consisted in 71% of the total. 
On the other hand, a completely different pattern is concerning the Nordic countries, that passed 
from 4% of 2017 to 23% of 2018. Positive trend can be observed also in the Benelux and 
Southern Europe region. 
Among the top sectors, one of the strongest one for growth is automotive, with the acquisition 
of Volvo by Geely for 3.1 billion euros. Also, financial and business services and health and 
biotech have seen an increase in investments. Totally different is the scenario for transport, 
utilities and infrastructure, with a drop of 96% compared to 2017 
 
 









European screening framework. 
The screening tool for FDI proposed by the European Commission in September 2017 and 
approved by the European Parliament in November 2018 is part of this trend. This new 
framework deeply influences the treatment of inbound acquisitions. The framework allows the 
European Commission to issue non-binding opinions on acquisitions (venture capitals and 
greenfield investments are excluded) with the member state obliged to justify its decision when 
against the European Commission’s opinion. 
Even if the new framework should not be considered as a real stringent screening tool, but more 
like a loose coordination and cooperation framework, it represents a milestone in analysis of 
foreign acquisitions. Firstly, it takes into account different sectors for what is related to national 
security, with the possibility of expanding the range in the future. Secondly, the framework 
aims to prevent and identify acts of “circumvention” a national screening, inviting the member 
states to look beyond the mere investments coming from China, but also keeping track of intra-
European investments of Chinese owned companies. 
 
Startup in China. 
The Chinese startup ecosystem is booming. Despite a decrease in investments made by venture 
capital firms, the startup ecosystem is the second largest in the world in terms of amounts raised, 
invested and exited. 
The origins of such massive sector can be found in the born of tech giant Baidu, Tencent and 
Alibaba two decades ago. These companies concentrated knowhow and best practices around 






Fundraisinig is considered difficult, especially compared to european and US ecosystem. A 
report carried out by Silicon Valley Bank, stated that 88% of Chinese startups struggle to raise 
capital. Even if, venture capital industry has strghten its position in China and it is considered 
as the main source of financing for Chinese startups, the last years have seen a substantial 










Table 14. Crash Crunch. Source: ChinaVenture/TechCrunch 
 
As reported by ChinaVenture, data registered a decrease of about 50% in the amount of money 
raised by domestic startups. This down going trend should be read as the research for an 
equilibrium in the sector. The booming of investments of 2016, coming from domestic and 
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the investors’ “fear of missing out” opportunities. Now, Chinese investors are gaining more 
knowledge and expertise in understanding real opportunities and they are specializing in 
determined sectors. One of these is surely artificial intelligence. SVB report states that AI and 
life science related startups are the most promising ones, they are thriving and getting funds 
more easily. In this context, an interesting new investors’ attitude is getting attention in the 
ecosystem. Chinese venture capitalists are getting interested in backing foreign companies. 
Especially for what concerns artificial intelligence, Chinese investors understood the 
importance of “buying” what they cannot get at home. In what is considered a new “space race” 
against US, China wants to play a major role in this sector, even if this means resorting to 
foreign resources. After the “public slap” of Google DeepMind AI software who defeated the 
world champion Ke Jie in go, one of the most famous and ancient board game in China, the 
government has launched a plan to develop and increase AI industry, pushing big tech company 
of China in pouring millions in the sector. 
Limitations imposed by Trump to Chinese investment in US, led the flow of investment mainly 
to Israel and Europe. Italy is not strong in AI, but is one of the main players, if not the leader, 
in pharmaceutical sector, that is the second blooming field in China. Biotech and pharma SMEs, 
who represent a big part of the Italian industry, may look east in the search for opportunities. 
 
 
2.9  Cultural differences 
 
One of the main challenges in doing business in a foreign country are the cultural differences 
between two players. This is particularly true in a country like China, that is very different, for 
geographical distance and political history, from western countries. As Hofstede (1993) said 
"there is something in all countries called 'management', but its meaning differs to a larger or 
smaller extent from one country to another". The study of culture in business attitude is rich 
and provides various model. One very explicative one is surely Hofstede model, built in 1980, 
which identified four factors who influence the way a country does business. Later, the model 
was revisited by Bond (1989) who inserted another factor. The five factors are: power distance, 
individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity, uncertainty avoidance and long-term/short-
term orientation. 
Power distance is the extent of hierarchical control on lower ranking individuals. A society with 




of power. Individualism/collectivism is an index of the degree to which people are integrated 
into groups. Individualistic society are formed by relatively loose ties, in which people feel to 
belong only to a small group, i.e. a family. On the opposite, collectivistic society are formed by 
people who feel part of a larger group, usually loyal and supportive. Masculinity/femininity 
represent respectively the attitude to succeed, to obtain material reward and heroism, and the 
attitude to care for the weak, to cooperate and to be modest. Uncertainty avoidance is the degree 
of tolerance for ambiguity.  Society with high degree of uncertainty avoidance prefer predefined 
laws and rules and predictable behaviors. On the other hand, low uncertainty avoidance 
characterizes countries who prefer free-flowing environment and acceptance of different 
thought and ideas. The last factor, the long-term/short-term orientation, is explicative of the 
extent to which past events are able to influence future events. This is particular clear, in 
honoring traditions. A country who is strongly attached to its past, has a short-term orientation, 
and usually does not look at distant goals in the future, but is more focused on the current state 
of things. On the other hand, a long-term orientation country puts pragmatism in reaching 
distant achievements before everything. 
If we look at the following graph (table 13) we can appreciate the main cultural differences 
between China and Italy. 
 
 























Italy is surely a more individualistic and risk-adverse country compared to China. These 
differences tend to emerge during the establishment of a partnership between a Chinese and 
Italian player. As we have said, the low level of individualism in China means that Chinese 
people tend to define themselves as “we” rather than “I”. This approach leads to a strong feeling 
of belonging to a group or a family. In business, this could imply that Chinese people will prefer 
to protect and favor people of their group or family, consequently excluding western 
businessmen.  
On the contrary, China has a high-power distance index compared to Italy. This translates in a 
strong devotion to rules and work even if further from home or headquarters. Indeed, it is 
globally acknowledged that Chinese are good workers devoted to their job, even if the work 
conditions are not good or comfortable.   
In the process of cooperation, Italian place greater importance on contractual safeguards than 
the Chinese, as we can deduct from the high level of uncertainty avoidance. They believe that 
contracts can ensure that their partners' tendencies to focus on individual goals and aspirations 
do not interfere with their own individual goals and aspirations. But the Chinese don't consider 
contracts as seriously as the Italian. They think there will always be changes and the contracts 
can be reasonably modified according to changes. Instead, they tend to pay more attention to 
relationships than contracts. 
Big differences are also for what concerns the resolution of conflicts. Collectivistic cultures 
emphasize cooperation, interdependence, and group goals, and thus prefer plans that support 
group harmony. Chinese belief in collectivism, make them less prone to the direct 
confrontation. Whenever a problem or a conflict should emerge, they tend to suppress it with 
authority or they decide to solve it privately, without interfering with public and general 
harmony of the group. This attitude translates also in the will of Chinese party to look for the 





With the word guanxi we indicate the system of social relationships shared by the same 
collective of people. As we will see, the guanxi represents a fundamental “tool” for doing 
business in China, but at the same time can be perceived as a brake, an obstacle for the correct 




The meaning of the word is expressed quite clearly by the two characters which compose the 
term. The first one is “guan” which means “door” or “closing, shutting”. The second one is “xi” 
that means “to bond, to link”. So, guanxi can be literally translated as “crossing the closed door 
to connect with others”, that is to overcome the obstacle a Chinese may find on the road thanks 
to the relationships he has. In the actual business definition of the expression guanxi, it is 
referred as the valuable.  network It is a friendship that implies the continuous exchange of 
favors (Pye 1982). Once the favor is obtained, the one who benefit should be ready to pay it 
back in time, even years after the favor. Whenever this does not happen, the person will be 
considered unreliable, and he will “diu mianzi”, i.e. he will lose his face. This will imply not 
only the loss of that particular guanxi, but also all the guanxi connected to that will be 
considered lost, in a chain effect. 
Guanxi are personal and should not considered as a corporate asset. They depend exclusively 
on the person who bring the favor in the company. This means that Guanxi cannot be between 
companies as abstract entities, but an intermediary should always be present. 
Fa vs guanxi 
According to a paper of Renzo Cavalieri, for foreign companies who operate in China is 
important to have in mind that coexist two kinds of law. There is the law, coming from the 
party, that is the official law, that is called “fa”, and then there is the guanxi, that is the common 
law. The do not have the same value, with the latter considered more important to Chinese. This 
is due to the fact that the rules coming from the national law are considered not objectives by 
the Chinese, but only a tool or an expression of the will of the party. The unification of the 
political powers without a form of control, delegitimizes, in a sense, the abovementioned rules 
and pushed Chinese to look for social rules able to mediate conflicts. So, the guanxi represents 











3. Challenges of doing Business in China. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the common and known problems and opportunities a 
SME may encounter during its journey in the Chinese ecosystem. A well-documented literature 
that evolved with years exists for this topic, but how we will see in the next chapter, I will also 





The approach to internationalization of SME is not always easy. The newness and smallness of 
those firm surely represent an important factor that make SME more prone to failure than larger 
established rivals (Lee et al. 2012). So, one important academic question that should be 
answered is “why do those firms, that are small and hence more subjected to external risk, seek 
out the additional risk of internationalize?” (McDougall, Oviatt, & Shrader, 2003). 
Multinational operations frequently proved to be associated with higher performance (Beamish 
and Delios, 1999). A SME will internationalize when the potential advantages exceed the 
disadvantages. 
The disadvantages I will analyze in this paragraph are of two types and are provided by the 
OECD: internal and external. Internal, are due to elements which lack or are present inside the 
firm, that bring the company to “endanger” the business activity. On the other hand, the external 
ones, are typical of the business environment in which the SME internationalize, that in our 
case is Chinese ecosystem. 
The internal barriers are: 
 
 Informational barriers. The informational barriers are due to the lack of knowledge 
about foreign markets and international opportunities. Due to geographical distance and 






 Human resource barriers. The human resource barriers are connected to the lack of 
the right managerial skills to manage and set a business outside the domestic borders. 
Often, the staff is not enough specialized and communication problems may arise 
between the foreign and the domestic staff. 
 
 Financial barriers. This barrier manifests as a shortage in funding to finance the 
working capital in the foreign country or as the difficulty of insuring assets abroad. 
 
 Product and price barriers. These barriers are due to the inability of SME of adapt its 
product to the design and style of the foreign market. They manifest also as the 
impossibility of reaching the legal standards for quality provided in that country. Also, 
the price, if not well set, is a barrier, because a too high price means the inability of the 
firm to match the competitor’s price and consequently the loss of market shares. 
 
 Distribution, logistics and promotion barriers. They consist in the difficulties of use 
or find the proper sale channels abroad. These barriers can also explicit in logistics 
related difficulties such as supplying inventory abroad, paying insurances or providing 
proper after sales. 
 
The external barriers are: 
 Procedural barriers. They are barriers associated with the operating aspects of 
transactions with foreign customers. They may be the difficulties of following the right 
legal procedures in terms of permissions and paperwork. Also, the difficulty of 
enforcing the contracts due to the poor quality of them or lack of knowledge of the 
foreign legal system can be considered as procedural barriers. 
 
 Governmental barriers. These are barriers linked to the will of the government to 
prefer the domestic firms at the expense of the internationalized SMEs. This could result 
in funfair tax regimes or the need of special permissions for operating in certain sectors 
for the foreign SMEs 
 
 Customer and foreign competitor barriers. The habits of the customers in the foreign 




competition is particularly keen and focused and does not allow the entrance of external 
firm or the maintenance of a competitive position 
 
 Business environment barriers. These are barriers linked to the political and socio-
cultural environment of the foreign firm. The environment may be hostile because of 
currency exchange risk, but also because of totally different way conceiving 
relationships in the business context. The presence of an authoritarian regime who does 
not guarantee the property right, for example, is a quite strong barrier. 
 
 Tariffs and non-tariffs barrier. These barriers are related to the presence of excessive 
duty for imported goods or other standards that have to be met. For example, technical 
or safety standards of the good. The presence of embargoes shall be also considered in 
























This thesis is centered on the activities of Italian SMEs in their approach to the Chinese 
market. For this reason, I will now match the theoretical framework provided by the OECDD 












 Lack of expertise (partly reduced by 




Human resource barriers 
 
 
 Mainly family businesses managers 
who lack of language skills; 
 







 Defensive strategy of Italian SMEs 
 
 
Product and price barriers 
 
 
 Made in Italy highly appreciated 
 
 Be aware of “sounding Italian” 
 
 
























 Bureaucracy is improving in terms of 
speed 
 










 Not really a problem. 
 
 Good Chinese taxation. 
 




Customer and foreign competitors’ barrier 
 
 
 Made in Italy appreciated. 
 




Business environment barriers 
 
 
 Political interference. 
 







Tariffs and non-tariffs barrier 
 
 IP protection: Chinese efforts are 
important, but many problems 










3.2 The internal barriers. 
 
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, the internal barriers to internationalization 
according to OECD are informational barriers, human resource barriers, financial barriers, 
product and price barriers and distribution, logistics and promotion barriers.  
The lack of knowledge and resources that characterized these barriers will be analyzed in detail 
for the Italian SMEs scenario, with the aim of understating the status quo and the level of 
readiness of Italian firms. 
 
Informational barriers. 
The informational barrier in Italy is directly linked with the network model of 
internationalization. One of the most stressed problem of the abovementioned model is the 
possibility for some SMEs to rely exclusively on the network to expand its activities. If the 
company does not have the right network of other companies who internationalize and hence 
provide knowledge to the other members of the network, it could easily lead to dead ends (Uzzi, 
1997) (Burt, 1992). Centro Studi A.P.I. (Associazione Piccole Medie Imprese) carried out a 
survey on mechanics and chemical companies (some of the most important sectors of action 
abroad for the Italian companies) in Lombardy. The results show that the lack of knowledge 
and information about the foreign markets is still one of the most important brakes for SMEs 
which want to go international. In Italy, according to this study from Prometeia, the presence 
of foreign FDI helps Italian companies to develop and international awareness and more 
modern way to conduct activities. This attitude inevitably is spread across sectors thanks to the 
network. Attracting foreign investment may eventually increase the awareness of our 
companies. 
 
Human resources barriers. 
Many studies have demonstrated the key role of the human resources in determining the success 
of internationalization (Leonidou, Katsikeas, & Piercy, 1998) and it seems there is a positive 
relation between the competences of the management and the propension to internationalize  
(Manolova, Brush, Edelman, & Greene, 2002). The presence of mainly family businesses in 




difficult for the Italian SMEs to get the right competences to internationalize (Bannò & Sgobbi, 
2005). 
A study conducted by Pedrini and Dal Bianco (2007) on a group of 300 SMEs from Lombardy, 
found that the majority of the skills that are lacking and are requested by the firms are language 
competences and only secondly competences related to the foreign market. These are the two 
main gaps in terms of skills which lack at human resources. These firms use “coaching” as the 
main way to learn and teach. The choice of hiring a “coach” is not only due to the lack of 
resources, but also to the particular asset of the management that is familiar and that seek a 
direct and immediate knowledge. Furthermore, for the companies analyzed in the paper, the 
problem of learning, even though a coach, come from the difficulty of separating the operative 
moment with the learning ones. 
 
Financial barriers. 
The financial barriers intended as internal barriers are the monetary challenges the SMEs faces 
in the process of internationalization. The question I try to answer here is “do Italian SMEs 
have enough internal funds to carry out internationalization campaign?”. 
An important help in answering the question comes from the Cerved Report about the Italian 
SMEs status. The situation emerging from the scenario has as main element of analysis, a 
general deceleration of SMEs economic growth. Revenues grown of only 4,1%, a declining 
data compared to 4,4% of the previous year. Also, the value-added grown less than the cost of 
work (4,1% vs 5,6%) with bad results on productivity and margins.  
Profitability indexes and level of failures measured alarming data. As we can see from the 
following two pictures, profitability indexes continued the robust decline. In addition, after the 
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However, in this alarming scenario, Cerved reported a healthy and mature level of financial 
stability of Italian SMEs. Financial debts increased with a rate of 2,2% in 2018 compared to 
1,2% of 2017, but looking at the level of health of equity capital, SMEs improved it at an higher 
pace of 8%. The number of SMEs in the database with solid financial statements has reached 
its maximum since 2012, while the same positive trend happened for the company with the 
lowest ranking, which reached a minimum in 2017. 
Interesting it is Cerved’s comment on the investment situation. Investments, especially in 
manufacturing SMEs, increased, touching the 7,1% from 6,4% of the previous year. The 
absolute value of investment remains, unfortunately, under the level pre-crisis. It is curious to 
notice that this low level does not depend on the bad quality of SMEs’ financial “backbone”. 
On the contrary, the report shows that companies have a lot of investment potential unused. If 
they would increase the level of debt until the threshold of two times the EBITDA (that is 
considered a level of safety), they could benefit of investments for 133 billion of euros. 
This defense strategy is the real barrier which prevents SMEs from internationalizing.  
 
Price and product barriers. 
History techs us that Italian product are well appreciated in China. However, the changes in the 
attitude, as I have already said, are not to be undervalued. As it will assessed in the chapter 
related to the opportunities of Italian firms in Chinese market, an important element that will 
drive consumption will be the ability of Italian firm to innovate and set themselves competitive 
ad a “digital” level. So, the barrier in this sense is not related to the lack of understanding of 
Chinese consumers ‘will. It is more related to the wrong approach to communicate in the 
market.  
It can be easily shown through the Italian fashion industry how the digital communication is 
fundamental. Explicate is the case of Versace. Despite many western fashion players, who are 
struggling to keep the pace with Chinese social media, Versace has a strong presence online in 
China with the social network Sina Weibo. Through this social, the company promotes products 
endorsed by Chinese and international celebrities. It was appreciated until it committed one 
single error. In August it promoted a shirt which reported Hong Kong as separated state, 
provoking resentment and hate toward the brand. One single error (although not small) is able 




Dolce & Gabbana. Without getting into whether the racism of their spot was real (it showed a 
Chinese model struggling to eat pizza and spaghetti with chopsticks), the real negative 
consequences occurred later the accident on social media. The inability of the brand to admit 
their errors plus a late apologize video on the social Weibo (it is a twitter-like platform), costed 
a shrink of 2% of sales in Asia zone. 
On a completely different path is Gucci. Gucci is also very active on Chinese socials. It is 
mainly present on a social called “Douban”, which allows users to create and post film, music 
and other multimedia content. Thanks to Douban, Gucci promoted “Cut&Craft” contest, that 
push users to be express their creativity creating home-made bags with Gucci’s tips.  
Another good example of integration of Italian product inside the Chinese market is the food 
industry. Made in Italy food is recognized worldwide for its high competitiveness in quality 
and safety. The rapid changes in consumption are making the consumers more aware of quality 
and safety issues of the food, despite the price is still the most important driver in the choice of 
the product. In this view, the Italian food represents an appealing alternative for Chinese 
consumer. Italy has always been the second exporter of olive oil in China, with Spain as leading 
country, but analysts say thing may change in the next future. Italy is the only country which is 
seen its share in oil exportation rising. The rising Chinese middle class is pushing the 
consumption of oil, once considered a luxury product. 
The same can be said about Italian pasta with 23 million of euro sold in 2018. 
A symptom of appreciation of Italian products abroad, even if harmful for our economy, is the 
“Italian sounding” phenomena. With this expression, it is meant application of practices of 
imitation to food products It identifies a set of phenomena carried out through the use of 
ingredients of lower quality and value than the originals, a productive process directed to cost 
containment and avoiding of legal requirements; and also the counterfeiting of company 
identity, geographical origin, productive process and most important, the imitation of specific 
aspects of a product that suggest a misleading geographical origin, like the improper use of 
words, colors, names, places, images (Nomisma, 2003). The economic consequences for SMEs 
are huge. Coldiretti has estimated an economic damage of one hundred billion of lost revenues.  
The phenomenon concerns many products of Italy, but in China the problem is mainly related 
to Italian cheese. The famous “parmesans” produced in America (which are not allowed in EU) 
are sold in China with Italian sounding labels (for example with Italian flag). Their presence is 
massive with 5 American cheese versus only one coming from EU. Although the problem is 




unfortunately present worldwide and presents few things to do in order to solve it. Economic 
agreements and ad-hoc rules between China and Italy are not enough. It is needed the proper 
communication of Italian culture and food (an Italian version of Confucius Institute), with 
Italian SMEs investing on marketing created specifically for China. 
 
Distribution, logistics and promotion barriers. 
This specific barrier is associated to owning and correctly managing the ability to reach the 
foreign market. This topic can be easily addressed referring to the previous point in which I 
stated the lack of expertise of SME management. Italian SMEs managers do not have enough 
knowledge about foreign distribution channel, they do not know how to correctly prompt their 
activity on foreign land and often they decide to launch the internationalization process without 
any help. As we will see during the interview with the export manager, Mariano De Santo, a 
figure who knows how to move between bureaucracy and insidious partners is mandatory. 
 
 
3.3 The external barriers. 
 
Procedural Barriers. 
During the research for this thesis I found on website specialized in Chinese law, a simple but 
effective advice about Chinese contracts: “make them enforceable or don’t bother”. Although 
it is a semi-serious statement, it is indeed true that enforcing contracts in china is not an easy 
job. In addition to the different culture, the language and a different way of conceiving the 
business and the job relationships sets even higher barriers. So, if a company wants to do 
business in China, it should have its back covered.  
The first question a western company should ask itself is: am I contracting with the right party? 
To found itself prepared the company signing the contract should always be sure that the dealing 
party is holding company and not the contracting manufacturer. In addition, misunderstanding 
may arise also if the company is part of a group. These misunderstandings are in part due to the 
lack of western name from the majority of Chinese firm. So, it is fundamental to write the 





In general, it is appropriate to select Chinese as the legal language of the contract. English is 
not so common and there would be the risk of double interpretation of the document. 
If the company found itself in a situation of trading with a Chinese company, of course is 
important to state the national law applied to the contract. The Chinese civil law allows ta 
foreign law to be applied in the situation of an international contract where at least one of the 
parties is not Chinese. Also, in the choice of the judicial court the Chinese law allows 
“contractual autonomy”. However, in “everyday life” we see a limited number of such 
situations. This is due to an extensive interpretation of article 282 of Chinese civil law, which 
denies the liberty of choosing the juridical court in presence of alleged violations of “law 
essential principles of People Republic of China” and of “state public and social interest”. 
Bureaucracy, remembered as sclerotic and corrupt, is improving, making easier for companies 
to operate in China. According to the World Bank Index about “easiness of doing business”, 
China ranked at position 30, which is better than Italy at 58. If we consider that in 2014 it ranked 
at 90, we can appreciate the progress.  
China is following the Singaporean way, aiming to digitalize many services and procedures that 
were typically dealt with documents. Due to this, the days to open a business now are nine 
compared to 22 days of previous years (for domestic investors). For foreign investors, the policy 
“one window, one form” led to the creation of an online platform where foreign investors can 
go through the majority of the procedures without paying any commission.  
 
Governmental Barriers. 
As we will see, no specific governmental barriers emerge. I will cover the tax regime and the 
financial aids coming from Italy, assessing a positive situation. 
The Chinese taxation is system for foreign enterprises and foreign investment enterprises is the 
following: 
Corporate Tax on Income (CIT): the standard tax rate is 25% but it could be lowered to 20% 
for “small profits” companies. If the company is high-tech, it can benefit of an additional 
discount for a rate of 15%. In the case of new companies, there is a fiscal exemption for the 
first two years, replaced with a rate of 12,5% for the subsequent three years at the end of which 




The definition of “small profits” company has been broadened on January 2019. The new 
definition consists in the following criteria: 
  
Eligibility criteria for 
preferential CIT 
Previous threshold New threshold 
Annual taxable income ≤ RMB 1M ≤ RMB 3M  
N° of employees ≤ 80 (≤ 100 for industrial 
entreprise) 
≤ 300 
Total assets ≤ RMB 10M (≤ RMB 30M for 
industrial enterprises) 
≤ RMB 50M 
 
In the following cases, the company can benefit of the following discount rates: 
 
 High-tech companies 15% 
 
 Companies which produces IC 10% 
 
 Qualified technology-advanced service enterprises 15% 
 
 Companies established in Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Modern Services Industry 
Cooperation Zone 15% 
 
 Companies established in Zhuhai’s Hengqin New Area 15% 
 
 Companies established in the Pingtan Comprehensive Experimental Zone 15% 
 
 
 From 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2021, qualified small profit enterprises with an 
annual taxable income of 1-million-yuan renminbi (CNY) or less are applicable to the 
effective CIT rate of 5%. Where their annual taxable income exceeds CNY 1 million 
but does not exceed CNY 3 million (inclusive), the CNY 1 million portion will be 
subject to an effective CIT rate of 5%, whereas the excess portion will be subject to the 





Annual taxable income Previous preferential CIT New progressive pref. CIT 
ATI ≤ RMB 1M 10% 5% 
RMB 1M < ATI ≤ RMB 3M Not applicable 10% 
 
 
 From 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2020 companies established in the Western 
Area 15% 
 
 From 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2021 companies involved in pollution 
reduction 15% 
 
Withholding income tax to non-residents: on May 2019 Italy and China has signed a new 
agreement aimed to void double imposition for what concerns interest, dividends, royalties and 
capital gains. According to the new agreement: 
 Dividends are taxed at a rate of 5% instead of 10%. This happens in the case the direct 
participation of the share capital is at least 25%, maintained at least for 365 days. For 
every other situation, the rate is 10%. 
 
 The withholding on interest cannot exceed 10% the gross amount. It is envisaged a 
reduction to 8% for interest due to bank and financial institutions for investment 
projects. However, the agreement envisages the exemption of such rates for interest due 
to governmental institutions. 
 
 Art. 12 provides the maximum roof of 10% rate for royalties on copyrights. It is also 
provided an effective rate of 5% (10% it is applied on the 50% of the nominal value) 
for the use of industrial, commercial and technological tools and equipment. It is 
important to notice that the rate stipulated with Italy are lower than the one stipulated 
with other European countries. 
 
 For capital gains, the new agreement confirms the known rate of 10% when deriving 




The Italian company which has interest in exporting goods in China must pay the following 
taxes: 
 Value-added tax (VAT): from April 2019, goods imported in China are subjected to 9% 
or 13% VAT. The nine per cent applies to goods in the category of agriculture and utility 
items. The 13% tax is addressed to all the other goods. The input is: 
 
“Sales x VAT rates”. 
 
 
 Consumption tax (CT): it is levied on five categories of products: harmful products 
(tobacco, liquor, firework etc.); luxury goods and non-necessities; high-energy 
consumption and high-end products (such cars and motorcycles); non-renewable and 
non-replaceable petroleum products; financially significant products. It can be 
calculated ad valorem: 
 




Consumption tax payable = Taxable sales quantity x Tax amount per unit 
 
For exports goods, the consumption tax should not be paid. If the product exported 
was previously imported in China, the CT paid on it is refundable. For good that are 
VAT exempt also CT is exempted, but in that case is not possible to obtain refund for 
the previously paid CT in importing. 
 
 
 Custom duties: it consists in import and export duties on 8549 items taxed. The import 
duties depend on the country which is exporting the goods. In the case of Italy, China 
applies a favorable regime, because of its belonging to WTO. It is important to notice 
that China has gone through several rounds of duties reduction from 2018 to 2019 in 
order to give stimulus to a slowing down economy. These reductions have favored 
Italian products because they cover pharmaceutics, pasta, shoes and clothes.  




Ad valorem basis: 
 








Duty payable = DPV x Tariff rate + Quantity of imported goods x Amount of duty per 
unit 
 
In order to some product to be imported, it is mandatory the presence of the CCC brand (China 
compulsory certification). The rationale behind it similar to the CE brand in Europe, although 
the standards required are different. The list of products is viewable on the website of China 
Quality Certification Centre. 
On the Italian side, our government provides several financial aids for the company which want 
to internationalize. As it possible to read from the Ministero dello Sviluppo Economico (Mise) 
website, the internationalization is promoted through “voucher” that allow the company to hire 
an export manager. 
Introduced in 2017, the voucher systems for internationalization is aimed to SME of any 
juridical form. Can benefit of the vouchers also network of companies with minimum revenues 
of 500.000 € in the last financial year. 
 
There are two types of voucher: 
 
 Voucher early stage. This voucher is for the companies which are applying for the first 
time. It consists of 10.000 € coming from the government plus 3.000 € coming from the 






 Voucher advanced stage. In this case the voucher consists in 15.000 € with 10.000 € of 
funding coming from the company. If the company is able to reach determined 
milestones, it can benefit of additional voucher.  
 
The listed companies will provide service of “tutoring” the company which benefited of the 
voucher during six months with a Temporary Export Manager. 
The service itself seems well structured and as we can see from different surveys (among which 
the abovementioned A.P.I one) we can see that the financial barrier is not a real issue for Italian 
SMEs. 
 
Customer and foreign competitor barriers. 
This type of barrier is associated mainly with the tastes and attitude of the Chinese consumer. 
As I said multiple time during this thesis, the attitude is changing toward more sophisticated 
and high-quality goods. 
Without entering in the depth of the analysis, it is possible to assess that this attitude is positive 
for Italian SMEs that can leverage on the quality and the provenience of “made in Italy” brand. 
So Italian products are appreciated, not only with relation to food and fashion, but also in sectors 
that are typically B2B. Italian manufacturing and mechanic tools producers are appreciated in 
China for the high customization and quality of the products. In 2018, 10% of Italian 
manufacturing of such products have been exported to China, representing the third largest 
target country for Italy. 
Italy, on the contrary, is the fifth supplier of mechanic tools for China. Unfortunately, such 
numbers are far from 2013 data and declining since then. The real challenges faced by Italian 
producers is their impossibility to overcome the concept that “producing quality products is 
enough”. Mass production of competitors and their ability of providing advanced IoT 
manufacturing tools, mine seriously the future of Italian export for this sector. 
 
 
Business Environment Barriers. 
The Chinese business environments is promising but at the same time has some dark spots. 




can conclude that it is not impossible to imagine China as world economy leader in the next 
years. 
Of course, when we talk about business environment barriers we talk about multiple and 
complex variables that may or may not foster foreign economic activities in China. Culture and 
language barrier, for example, represents a non-indifferent obstacle for foreign entrepreneurs 
who find themselves in struggle trying to understand and to maneuver between guanxi and fa, 
as I have already said. 
But the main obstacle related to business environment barriers is another. I deem it to be the 
political ecosystem. 
“Globally, sources of turmoil and points of risk are multiplying”, stated Xi Jinping in January 
2019 at the Central Party School. He continued “the party is at risk from indolence, 
incompetence and of becoming divorced from the public”. These declarations have been 
followed by summoning of the major representatives of PRC with one aim: be aware of politics, 
ideology, economy, science and technology, society, the external environment, and Party 
building, that are several risk areas rising. 
Indeed, 2019 represented a delicate year for China, for what concern politics and economy. 
First of all, there is diffused sense of ideology crisis. The party tightened control across the 
internet via the Cyberspace Administration of China, launching several campaigns aimed to 
clean up all the “negative and harmful” information. Many analysts noted that even censorship 
is changing in China. Due to its massive presence on world market, its way of interfering is 
“exceeding the borders”, involving other countries and international brands. If twenty years ago 
the intrinsic closure of the country limited dangerous communication of western companies 
about the internal political situation, now many historical brands found themselves in the core 
of the clash for the Hong Kong crisis. For example, a pro-Hong Kong tweet of the captain from 
the general manager of the Houston Rockets, let to NBA games being pulled from the Chinese 
television. 
The same situation applies to western universities, who have in China branches and campuses. 
They feel the pressure of potential censorship, because one wrong word may mean deleting one 
important source of income that is represented by Chinese student.  
Basically, Chinese government is using both visas and market access as a censorship weapon 




From a business point of view, at the moment the Party has reached dangerous level of 
interference, compared to the past. It is a return to nationalization of economy that should scare 
foreign companies. For sure is mining Chinese private companies, which have seen a steady 
reduction of credit in the last years, in favor of state-owned enterprise. 
 
 
Table 18. Flow of loans to non-financial enterprises by ownership. Source: China Banking Society. 
 
 
Tariff and Non-tariff Barriers 
When we talk about intellectual property protection in China, we automatically associate it with 
the words “fake, copy and fraud”. It is true that protecting own intellectual property in China is 
not easy, but in order to fully understand what the threats may be, we should analyze in detail 
in what consist IP protection in china. 
We should begin saying that the IP protection law has changed drastically during the last years. 
China has made huge efforts to make its legislation modern and respectful of international 
standards. The SIPO, the former State Intellectual Property Office, now became the CNIPA, 
the Chinese Intellectual Properties Authority, with extended power of control, reporting directly 
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Special courts dedicated to IP protection have been established in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Guangzhou. In addition, in 2019 China created a special court dedicated to IP as part of 
Supreme People’s Court. 
Huge efforts have been made also with regards to patent, trademark and copyright laws, with 
an upgrade that is still going on. 
Although the progress is clear, many problems remain. According to a recent report by EU 
Commission, the situation is still unfair for many European companies, who face a competition 
driven by unequal rules for local Chinese companies.  While many western firms are owners of 
standard essential patents (SEP), that are crucial for the correct working of some technologies 
(for example 4G communications), many Chinese companies use such patents without paying 
adequate enough royalties, leaving the western companies with disproportionate fees to pay. 
A recent amendment to the trademark law seems be promising for a better future, but also in 
this sector remains important loopholes in the procedures that keep Chinese companies to 
deposit trademark with bad faith.   
FTT, or forced technology transfer, is still a spread phenomenon. It consists in the forcing for 
western companies, especially from governmental entities, to transfer their technology and 
knowledge to China, in exchange of market access. It is a systematic problem, carried out by 
many entities on multiple levels, that results in western companies licensing their know-how at 
very low rates or fees. It is to in the future how these problems will evolve with the new FIL 
law, which in theory should eliminate such practices. 
Also counterfeiting represents still a huge problem for western companies. The Commission's 
Report on EU customs enforcement of intellectual property rights (2018) shows that 80% of 
fake products came from China, make it the main producer of counterfeit article in the world. 
Although it would be unfair to not mention the policies and actions of the Chinese government, 
the problem is far to be solved. 
After having seen the main problematics, it is necessary to go in the details about patents and 
trademarks, showing the “technical aspects” of Chinese procedures. 
Let’s start from patent. China is part of the Patent Cooperation Treaty; it signed Paris 
Convention and has rules coherent with the international standards. 





The invention patent is related to technical solutions or improvement to a product or a process, 
provided that the technical solution has a practical applicability. Obviously, it should not have 
been disclosed previously through publications (newspaper, scientific journal, papers etc.) This 
means the novelty principle should be respected. 
The utility model patent is similar to invention patent but protects new shape or physical 
structure of a new product. A common practice in China is to file both the UM patent and the 
innovation patent. In this way the company can benefit of the early protection provided by the 
UM and the longer extent provided by the invention patent. In order to benefit from this 
practice, is mandatory to file the applications on the same day, declaring the double filing. In 
the case one of the two is refused, automatically also the other one is refused. 
The design patent covers the shape, the pattern, the shape and pattern, the shape and color, the 
shape, pattern and color of a product. In order to apply for it, the product should not have been 
used in China. It is common to describe accurately why the design should be considered new, 
how it can be used in industry, how it can be produced in batches. Highlighting these, will 



























Invention 900 2500 3-5 20 
UM 500 No 1 10 




Invention Surcharge for claims in excess of 10 (per claim) 150 Surcharge for 
specification in excess of 30 pages (per page) 50 Surcharge for 
specification in excess of 300 pages (per page) 100 
UM Surcharge for claims in excess of 10 (per claim) 150 Surcharge for 
specification in excess of 30 pages (per page) 50 Surcharge for 
specification in excess of 300 pages (per page) 100 
Design Surcharge for claims in excess of 10 (per claim) 150 Surcharge for 
specification in excess of 30 pages (per page) 50 Surcharge for 





Annuity fees (years) 
1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 13-15 16-20 
Invention 900  1200 2000 4000 6000 8000 
 
Patent 
Annuity fees (years) 
1-3 7-9 13-15 16-20 
UM 600 900 1200 2000 









Trademarks in China must respect the following requirements in order to be deposited: 
 
 It must be legal; it must not be identical or similar to a state name or a flag; It must not 
be identical or similar to Chinese governmental entities names and logos; It must not be 
identical or similar to specific locations, landmarks, logo and theme song of Chinese 
Army. It must be legal - it must not be identical or similar to Red Cross or other 
international organization logos; it must not be discriminative, exaggerated and 
containing fraudulent advertising etc. 
 
 It must be distinctive; 
 
 non-functional (this apply to 3D shapes that cannot be registered if they generate from 
the product itself and so are a merely reproduction of the product, if they incorporate a 
technical aspects or element that keep the competitor away from reproducing it, if it 
enables the product to be valuable);   
 










4. Opportunities of doing business in china. 
As we have seen in the previous paragraph of this thesis, the great big question mark for the 
future development of Chinese economy are consumptions. The evolution of the buyer persona 
in China is still something that is under analysis by many analysts and eventually will determine 
the attributes that the economy demands. What I want to show in this thesis is the incredible 
opportunity Italian firms have to enter the Chinese market. If “made in Italy” does not mean 
much in our country, many buyers in different country still appreciate the quality and the 
provenience of the product made in Italy. Of course, this is not enough. Doing business in China 
is still “hell” for inexperienced sailors so Italian firms need to master other attributes in order 
to make it in China.  
 
4.4 Italian presence and what we need. 
 
Italian companies in China are about 2000, with a total revenue of about 5 billion of dollars. 
The sectors in which they operate are quite diversified with prevalent share in manufacturing 
and textile industry. 
China represents a good importing country of Italian products. It is the ninth destination market 
for our country products and the number one considering only Asia. The rates of export growth 
are the fastest in terms of growth compared to the rest of the world. As we can see for the 
following table, the exports in Asia are growth of almost 6% from 2010. 
 
Geographical Areas Value (2018, € bln) Cagr 2010 - 2018 
Asia 39,3 5.9% 
Advanced markets 341,3 4.4% 
Latin America 14,1 3.3% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 5,5 2.8% 
CSI 16,3 1.7% 
Middle east & North Africa 38,8 0.6% 






In the same period, the sale of Italian products toward China are growth, on average, of 5,5%, 
going from 8.6 billion of euro to 13 billion in 2018. Although, in 2018 the data shows a small 
decrease (-2,4%). However, this decrease can be reconducted to general negative performance 
of the automotive sector. Indeed, after the sale boom of cars in 2017 (+70,1 %), they decrease 
of 60,3 the last year.  
The data shows a positive export year for what concern the sector of rubber and plastic (+ 6,2 
%) and electrics (+ 4,6 %), although, for what concerns the export of mechanic tools (the main 
Italian sector for exports), it has been recorded a small decrease. 
In general, the numbers show a quite positive future for Italian products in China. Analysts 
expect a continuous growth of Italian export in next years. The main opportunities will be in 
the electronics, chemical-pharmaceutical, mechanics and transportation mean sectors. In 
particular Italian manufacturers of mechanics tools will benefit an increase of demand of higher 
quality tools, in accordance to the general qualitative “upgrade” and to the “Made in China 
2025” program. 
 
Features that are appreciated. 
Data about Chinese market are quite clear: the consumptions are changing and evolving, 
bringing a new way to define what Chinese want and what they don’t. The real question here 
is: what can Italian companies give in terms of value added and appreciated features? 
Let’s start this analysis trying to understand in which way consumption are changing. As we 
have already said, Chinese consumers are not as they used to be. A study carried out by 
Accenture, shows the main characteristics the Chinese buyer persona seek in the customer 
journey. 
First of all, they are looking for liquid experiences. This means that the customer experience 
(CX) shall evolve into more sophisticated funnel.  This translates into the fall of the traditional 
separation between online purchase and offline purchase. Nowadays Chinese want to buy in a 
seamless experience. It is not enough important to stress the world “buying” because it is 
demonstrated that Chinese who buy online are more prone to buy online and vice versa. So, 





Another important aspect of the experience is “setting the scene”. Setting the scene means to 
allow the willing buyer to perceive how the product will be. Augmented reality and virtual 
reality are keys of success to let the consumer to “taste” the product before the actual sale.  
Furthermore, the experience should be “social”. Socializing the sale means to collocate the sale 
inside a community ecosystem. The digital generation in China feel to be part of communities 
and want to buy what is sponsored and accepted by its “clan”. Comments and recommendations 
are crucial for Chinese in assessing the goodness of a product. 
While these characteristics are quite general and may applied to different brand from all around 
the world, Made in Italy should be able to reinvent to adapt to those characteristic. 
It is important to say that not everything is so bright as often Italian media say. A recent study 
from ”Osservatorio Paesi terzi di Business Strategies” on the perception and acceptance of the 
“Made in Italy” shows some ambiguous results about the knowledge of Chinese consumers 
toward Italian brands. In general, consumer seems very prone and receptive for Italian brands. 
They look for new and novelty coming from our country especially for what concerns food 
(51%), fashion (45%), wine (29%) and cars (17%). But answering the question “Tell me the 
first Italian name or brand”, many Chinese “fail”, reporting their ignorance especially in the 
food sector, where the 69% of the interviewed is not able to tell even one name. The most 
famous Italian brand is Ferrari, known by 18%, followed by Gucci with 9%. Barolo and Fiat 
follow with 5%. Illy, that has a strong presence in China, is known only by 1% of the 
interviewed. Silvana Ballotta, CEO of Business Strategies, commented the results stating that 
the main problem of the Italian firms is that they are not able to communicate their mission and 
vision. 
On the other hand, we should not despair. As Ballotta also added, there is space for “us” in 
China. The recent history is full of good example of how the “italianity” of our product is 
accepted in China. For example, in fitness market. 
The fitness market is booming in china. The Accenture study shows that 60 per cent of the 
consumers interviewed spend more than 3 hours a week in keeping fit and training. Currently 
valued USD 235 billion, the market is expected to value 735 billion of dollars in 2025. 
As many things going on in China, in order to crowd out the market gym and fitness companies 
should think outside the box and try to merge the quality of the products with innovation. This 
is indeed the case of Technogym. The 2018 financial statements show an outstanding + 26% 




The foundation of an academy to form the trainers, in addition to the creation of a digital 
ecosystem inside the gyms, let the brand to be a reference point in Chinese gyms. 
 
 
4.5 Example of success. 
 
To conclude this thesis, I have decided to talk about cases related to the Sino-Italian 
cooperation, that should be seen as references, for all the Italian companies which want to start 
their Chinese journey. 
Thanks to the mediatic attention about the new Silk Road and the quite proactive role played 
by Italy, business cooperation between the two countries is getting stronger. Without talking 
about whether the political repercussion of this proactivity will be positive for the future of 
Italian centrality in the international scene, I focused on the immediate and favorable effects 
such relationship is creating. 
 
 
Port of Trieste and CCCC. 
The port of Trieste has signed a memorandum of understanding with the China Communication 
Construction Company (CCCC) to launch common project aimed to boost “Made in Italy” in 
China. The initiative will interest the Guangzhou, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Ningbo and Shenzhen 
area, with the intent to create a logistic corridor between Italy and China. 
The port authority will not have direct participation in the projects that will be, but will 




Panda bonds are bonds issued by Italian Cassa Depositi e Prestiti on the interbank Chinese 
market. The issuing of these bonds has a total value of one billion of RMB (130 million of euro) 
with a fixed interest rate of 4,5%. The bonds are the result of the Memorandum of 




increase the connection and the exchanges between the two countries. Italy is one of the few 
countries in Europe which have signed for the issue of the bonds together with Portugal, Poland, 
Hungary and Austria. 
The bonds are issued with the aim of helping foreign companies, which operates on Chinese 
land, to obtain funds. Due to the difficulty in access to credit for foreign enterprises, the bonds 
represent a valid alternative. 
 
 
Italy meets China: High Manufacturing. 
Italy meets China: High Manufacturing is the name of the second edition of the “Forum 
Bilaterale Sino Italiano sulla macchina utensile”. The event took place in November 2019 in 
Beijing and was promoted by the Ministry of economic development (MISE), UCIMU (that is 
the Italian association of mechanic tools manufacturer), Italian embassy in China and China 
Machinery Industry Federation. In the event more than one hundred of experts of the sector 
were presents, along with Italian companies’ part of UCIMU. These companies presented best 
practices and innovation with real applications in various sectors coming from the Italian 
industry. The aim of the event, according Massimo Carboniero, UCIMU chairman, is to create 
a point of dialogue on the 4.0 manufacturing topic, joining the industrial plan of both countries. 
 
Da Vinci Village. 
In the next two year, a village and hub for Italian SMEs will be built in Ningbo. Born from the 
will of Italian CNA (La Confederazione Nazionale dell'Artigianato e della Piccola e Media 
impresa) and the province of Ningbo Fenghua, the hub will be called Da Vinci Village and will 
host 150 small and medium enterprises. The agreement has been signed in Napoli in May 2019 
and represents a huge opportunity for Italian companies (especially in the handcrafted goods 
sector) because they will be able to access an area that has a GDP of 13 billion of euros. 
The initiative, created on the path of the New Silk Road, will make the city of Napoli and the 
city of Ningbo closer, bringing a virtual connection between the two markets. 
According to Giuseppe Oliviero, the national vice-president of CAN, the project will be 




Italian SMEs in Shaoxing. Later, in two years from now, the Da Vinci Village will be built on 
120.000 square meters, and it will be divided between residential areas and commercial places. 
 
Cdp and Unicredit for SMEs in China. 
Italian Cassa Depositi e Presititi, together with Unicredit bank, will launch a revolving credit 
line for Italian SMEs in China of 300 million of euro. Specifically, it will be destined to Italian 
SMEs working in China or Italian-owned Chinese companies, allowing the credit access also 
with RMB and co-financing tools. 
The project will help Italian SMEs also with a desk in the Shanghai branch, for improving the 
expertise of Italian companies in dealing with foreign markets and bureaucracy. 
 
 
China Italy Innovation Forum 
In November 2019 has been held the tenth edition of China Italy Innovation Forum. One of the 
key words of the recent agreements between Italy and China has been “innovation”. The 
cooperation between researchers and university has never been so strong. 
The forum, held in Beijing and Jinan and promoted on the Italian side by Città della Scienza, 
put together more than ten thousand experts in cooperation projects, more than five thousand 
entrepreneurial realities and favoring more than five thousand of technology transfer between 
the two countries.  
Besides the many praises coming from the respective governments and the presence of CNR 
and the most relevant Italian universities, the forum was also a possibility for Italian excellences 
to be appreciated abroad. In fact, the “China-Italy Best Startup Showcase”, at its third edition, 
allowed Italian promising startups to deal with Chinese clients and investors. Italian MIUR and 
its Chinese respective, the MOST, have launched this program in 2016 with the aim of 
promoting innovation in smart manufacturing, environmental sustainability, artificial 
intelligence and big data. The top 9 startups (among 100) had the opportunity to be present 







In this part of the thesis I have decided to collect some opinions from subjects who have touched 
with their hands what does it mean, for a small Italian business, to deal with China. 
As I previously mentioned, this part should not be considered as “experimental”. The data 
collected are mostly qualitative with the aim of providing to the reader a sentiment, more than 
a statistical truth. 
The subjects interviewed are: 
 Mariano De Santo, export manager. 
 Tommaso Gecchelin, startup founder. 
The question provided were all the same for all the interviewed with the exception of the 
questions for Tommaso Gecchelin. For him, I have decided to follow a different approach due 
to the diversity of the content of the interview. Indeed, I have talked with him about a specific 
episode happened to its startup, Next Future Transportation, which is, by the way, the startup 
where I am actually working in as business developer. The episode is about an aborted operation 
of funding coming from a Chinese investment group. For the specificity of his story, I have 
decided to let him talk, while I put myself in the place of the listener, interrupting him only to 
better channel the conversation. 
For Mariano De Santo and the questions were related to the following topics: 
 Brief description of the interviewed and its job. 
 Comments on the barriers to internationalization provided by the OECD, with his 
opinions on the most impacting ones. 
 Comments on the opportunities generating from dealing with Chinese market. 
 One negative anecdote (where challenges for SMEs were many). 









Interview #1 with Mariano De Santo. 
 
Mariano De Santo, is an “export expert” with forty years in the business working as export 
manager and now with its own company called AS International s.r.l. 
I had the pleasure to meet him via my father’s company, a transport and logistic company in 
Maddaloni near Caserta, who benefited of Mariano’s service for a long period in the past. So, 
when I told him about my thesis, he was very happy to help me and share its knowledge. 
The barriers. 
As the interview started and I provided him the questions related to internationalization barriers, 
he immediately stops me from any further explanation. He had from the beginning clear in his 
mind which is the most important challenge Italian company faces when dealing with China: 
the lack of expertise. According to him, many clients have the presumption to believe that is 
easy to deal in China. But once they start to venture on their own, they waste money and time, 
addressing their efforts in the wrong direction. Eventually, they end up asking for help in 
companies like AS International. “In order to doing business in China, you must know and 
resort to the right person, otherwise you will end up crashed between procedures and an alien 
language”. 
 For example, the bureaucracy, for what concerns the export is not a barrier per se. It may seem 
complex for an Italian company, but this is why export manager exists. Also, the culture, that 
for many aspects, seems very remote from Italian one, should be understood and considered as 
important when dealing with China. “They are great and strict workers, maybe even too much 
for our Italian standards. In fact, according to him, while we Italian tend to put friendship and 
extra work relationships first, they place work before everything. They are good and friendly 
people, but when it is time to do business, nothing comes first”. 
 
The opportunities. 
For what concerns the opportunity, as “exporter” he has no doubts that Made in Italy is still a 
big opportunity for companies which are able to place themselves in the market. However, he 
admitted that Chinese people have a very limited awareness of Italian brands. They know all 
the big brands, but they are ignorant in relation to the smaller excellences of our country. This 




increasing part of willing to buy consumers. They are ready to “receive” new products as long 
as they are perceived as “qualitative superior and rich lifestyle associated”. So, the objective of 
Italian SMEs should be to focus on communicating their value, leveraging on the Italian 
provenience. 
 
Positive and negative episodes. 
With his experience in the exporting business, Mariano has seen a clear increase in Chinese 
consumption of wine. He is positive that this trend will go on together with other “famous” 
food and brands of the made in Italy. As already said, the market is very dynamic and 
understanding the consumption trend is everything. He told me this anecdote that make me 
understood that China can still be a land of opportunity for few chosen products. He told me 
about an Italian exporter of fur and similar products, who when he started to perceive the decline 
of its business, he reinvented himself. In Shenzhen he opened a pizzeria (he had no past 
experience in the sector), which then led to the opening of various other pizzerias in the area. 
He invented his job from scratch, by observing what Chinese people wanted. 
However, Mariano stressed a very important concept. The “italianity” works only until you do 
not step on Chinese domestic business”. It is fundamental to not forget that China is a state 
driven country, very protectionist toward its affairs. Tax and duties on foreign product may 














Interview #2 with Tommaso Gecchelin. 
 
I met Tommaso in May 2019 and I immediately found his project very interesting. He is founder 
and CEO of a startup which has the objective of building a different mobility paradigm for our 
city. The idea at the center of the project is “car jumping”, that means an easier and quicker 
substitute of the traditional bus connections. In this case, instead of waiting at the bus stop the 
right bus for you, you can take the bus while moving. Indeed, Next’s buses are provided with 
opening doors that allow the bus to attach and detach from another one, allowing the passenger 
to change bus while moving. This idea has been acknowledged by the New York University as 
a game changer in the current mobility scenario, with an important reduction of traffic, stress 
and pollution. 
After our first meeting I have decided to become part if this project and currently I am working 
as business developer for Next. 
One of the first anecdotes Tommaso told me about Next’s past, is related to a failed funding 
operation coming from China. So, during the redaction of this thesis I thought that interviewing 
him about the episode, could provide a brief but real taste of the instability sometimes related 
to doing business in China. 
As already stated, I have decided to not aske questions directly to him, instead I let him talk, 
interrupting him when necessary. 
 
This is his description of the facts: 
In March 2018, after the Dubai presentation of our modules, Next came in contact with a 
Chinese vehicle producer, interested in financing the project and in acquiring the license for the 
Chinese market. The money involved were many, and the executives of the company went in 
China two/three times to meet and discuss about the deal. Everything was going in the proper 
way and we were obviously very happy about it. A curious episode is that during the first 
meeting, Next’s executives were invited to a “gargantuan” dinner with every kind of cooked 
and raw fish. The representatives of the Chinese vehicle manufacturer got drunk and burped 
freely, a thing that left our guys quite surprised and amused (a strong evidence of the diversity 




After the meetings in China, was time of the due diligence in Italy. Two European 
representatives of the Chinese company went in our offices to asses our work. They were quite 
impressed with the operations and the engineering of the modules, so the there was no problem 
encountered. Four months after the first contact with them, the deal was done and was time for 
celebrations. More or less, we are talking about August 2018.  
Everything was wonderful, except there was no sign of the money. The Chinese company 
started to say there were problems in sending the money due to the ongoing trade war with U.S. 
(Next is basically two companies, one in US and one in Italy. The founders are the same for 
both companies). After days of delays, Chinese company decided to send one eighth of the due 
money via a Dubai company affiliated to them. Now the thing gets fishy. The Dubai company 
sent the money but not as funding capital. Next was forced to issue invoice to get the money. 
Remember that at that moment only one eighth of the due investment was occurred. 
Months passed and the money were used to finance operations in Next. When cash was 
finishing, was time to contact again the Chinese company. The idea in our head was “they gave 
us only part of the money, without having back promised company shares, so it is impossible 
they will stop sending us money”. Those were last famous words. The Chinese company simply 
disappeared. No one ever replied to Next’s messages. After a while resignation took the place 
of anger. 
Months later, while interfacing with our partners, we found out that similar fate happened to 
other companies which were contacted by the same Chinese company. We started also to put 
together pieces and tried to understand what happened. 
The reality was that in China many companies were born during a series of governmental 
incentives to produce electric vehicles and to invest in AI related technologies. Many of those, 
unfortunately existed only to get incentives to successively disappear. In a way to limit the 
phenomenon, the government reduced the incentives and the Chinese company found itself 
with reduced resources. Furthermore, a former employee of them told us that they were getting 
problems in obtaining some licenses to manufacture. 
In retrospect, a mix of fate and our inexperience led us to ignore some aspects that could have 
avoided the situation. First of all, resorting to an expert with experience in dealing with Chinese, 
could lead us to make our own due diligence of the Chinese partner. The inexperience of the 




Chinese partners. Experts and advisors of the vehicles manufacturing sector could have advised 


























During the redaction of this thesis I understood and learned many things about China, but also 
many things about Italy. Problems and opportunities are typical of every business in every part 
of the world, it does not matter if it is a small medium firm or a multinational. However, going 
through the problems and barriers which keep our companies away from becoming international 
in China, and assessing our abilities and the merits the world acknowledges, I felt a feeling of 
squandering. Now I know the big potential unexpressed of Italian SMEs, that sometimes comes 
out despite the difficulties and despite our “being Italian”, that often self-sabotage us. 
Looking at the main obstacles, we face when dealing with China, we have to mention our lack 
of experience and know-how about internationalization. How seen also in the interview with 
Mariano De Santo, without the right person and mindset is not possible to deal with China. 
Exporting in such a foreign environment on your own eventually lead to failure, fostering the 
misconception that China is a hostile environment. Surely China presents some intrinsic 
problematics. The strong presence of the communist party, which is running the state under 
strong protectionist policies, is an important source of instability for every business there. 
Censorships and import duties do not help.  
Many cooperation policies and internationalization incentives may help Italy to be more present 
there. The signing of the memorandum of understanding for the Belt and Road Initiatives along 
with the cooperation events cited at the end of this thesis, are a strong sign that the will of 
improving the relationships and exporting the good we have is more present than ever. But what 
do we have that is considered good? Fashion and food, although may seem stereotypical, 
represent a good starting point for internationalization. The “Made in Italy” is still very 
appreciated and is driving Italian export in china. However, as I said before, this is not enough. 
Italian companies should start to do two things. Firstly, their approach to Chinese market should 
change. They should start to stress and properly communicate the values that make our product 
so unique. Chinese are wonderful people, but they are still “infant” buyers, who have seen their 
income increasing suddenly. Because of this, they want quality and reliable products, especially 
if foreign. Hence, this is the perfect time to communicate the ”being Italian” of  products. They 
will buy them. The second important thing Italian SMEs should understand, is that competition 
against competitors is not won only with quality. New markets and needs develop quickly in 
an infant market as Chinese one. While the communication of “Made in Italy” is important, it 
is important also to formulate new business models, able to adapt to the new digital and 




behavior. Indeed, technology should not be seen as enemy of quality, but a way to enhance it, 
as Italian fashion brands demonstrate. This rule applies also to B2B business like mechanic 
tools manufacturing. China is running the race for smart industry, with IoT and advanced 
machine learning integrated in the machines. If Italian SMEs want to be part of the race, 
eventually they will have to adapt themselves. 
I conclude this thesis with a message. Nowadays, misconception and misunderstanding of 
China and Chinese people is more detrimental for Italy than China, whether we like it or not. 
In a global changing scenario, it is becoming more and more evident that Asia will be center of 
the world. This does not mean we must be subjected to a different culture. Being Italian is 
something that Italian firms will never lose because it is synonym of talent and creativity, and 
those attributes are forever part of our DNA. Indeed, it means that new opportunities and 



















At the end of my academic journey, looking behind me, I do not see myself alone, having exams 
and bringing home results, I see my family with me. I see my mom and dad, who understood 
me when it was time to understand and clashed with me when it was time to clash. I see my 
brother and sister, Paolo and Francesca, who are also study companions of mine, with whom I 
have expressed my fears and with whom I laughed during many (maybe too many) study breaks. 
I see my lifelong friend Christian, standing by my side, who taught me how easy it can be when 
you have someone to rely on. 
Finally, I see Gaia, with whom I dreamed of exotic lands and remote times, far away from the 
university books which took away too many of our hours together. 
To all of you, my thanks will be never enough. This achievement is as much yours as it is mine. 
A special and warm thanks to Prof. Giacomazzi, who with his class and this thesis made my 
thoughts about my future career a bit clearer.  
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